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ABSTRACT 
Competition and Market Integration:  
The Case of China’s Auto Industry 
by 
TIAN Xi 
Master of Philosophy 
 
The “special treatments” of automobile industry in China, especially in the 
forms of local protectionism, have been criticized as evidences of domestic 
market fragmentation for long. Whether these “special treatments” have stunted 
the integration of a national auto market in China remains a question.  
 
This paper seeks to examine the degree of market integration in the automobile 
markets in China by using tests of cointegration between prices of spatial 
markets. Several econometric approaches for spatial price analysis, including the 
ADF unit root test, Maddala-Wu’s Fisher type panel unit root test and more 
restrictive Dufour-Torres panel unit root test are applied to monthly average 
retail prices for the main models sold across 36 cities from 1994-2006. Besides 
the above conventional linear methods, the author also applies the newly 
developed nonlinear unit root method proposed by Kapetanios et al. (2003).  
 
Test results indicate that the nonlinear test support convergence more often than 
the conventional linear unit root tests. Moreover, they also reveal that price 
convergence and hence market integration hold for majority of models and 
markets. The paper also investigates possible explanatory factors in price 
disparities of auto markets among cities. As the evidence shows, the geographic 
distance between markets, difference of per capital income, and the existence of 
local production play important roles in the absolute price differentials as well as 
the volatility of price differentials among cities.   
 
Keywords: Auto market of China; Domestic market fragmentation; Panel unit root test; 
Nonlinear unit root test 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation of the Study  
China’s car market is replete with examples of protectionism not only at the national 
level but also at regional and firm levels. To boost local economic growth, provincial 
and municipal officials often favor regional manufacturers and at times levy 
discretionary license fees to boost the market share of locally made cars. Such 
protectionist measures have allowed many capital-inefficient makers to remain in 
business.  
1.1.1 State Protectionism  
China’s car industry is indeed an infant industry. Before the mid 1980s, the majority 
of investment in the automobiles industry was by the central government. Since 1985, 
foreign multinationals have rushed into the automobile industry, and now most large 
automobile manufacturers are joint ventures. The total output of automobiles reached 
1.5 million vehicles in 1995. The output (value-added) of the industry was about 1 
percent of GDP in 1996. The automobile industry argued that since there were 
economies of scale in car manufacturing and the world car market was monopolized 
by a dozen or so companies in Japan, the United States and Europe, the only way in 
which China could emerge as a competitive automobile producer was via import 
substitution. Japan and Korea were citied as success models to follow. In particular, 
the industry argued that Japan and Korea have become two of the largest automobile 
producers in the world through high protection. So, it was argued, it is possible for 
China to build up its automobile industry behind high protection.  
 
The government introduced the “Industrial Policy for the Automobile Industry in the 
1990s” as response to the appeals. Under the policy, the industry has become China’s 
‘pillar’ industry, and car factories have flourished. By 1996, there had been 
established 120 factories producing complete vehicles, 600 factories rebuild vehicles 
and 2,400 factories producing components and spare parts. However, the national 
output of cars in 1996 was only 1.1 million vehicles, less than the annual output of a 
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moderate scale company in an industrial country. In addition, the automobile industry 
had gained powerful influence in trade policy over the 1990s. The central government 
protected the automotive industry from outside competition by high tariff and import 
quota on both vehicles and parts. The tariff on cars was 160 percent in 1992, 100-120 
percent in 1996 and 80-100 percent in 1997. This rate of tariff reduction was much 
slower than the average tariff level. In 1997, when tariffs were reduced by 35 percent 
on average, tariffs on cars were cut by only 25 percent. By also covering the tariff rate 
of auto-related industries such as machinery, iron and steel, rubber and electronics that 
stand at 10-20%, the effective rate of protection for the automotive industry is as high 
as 219%. The industry has formed a coalition which aims to keep overseas 
competitors out of the Chinese market. Ironically, most multinationals have 
successfully entered the Chinese market around the end of 1990s. Continuous 
protection merely allows these foreign multinationals and their Chinese partners to 
profit at the expense of Chinese consumers. For instance, in 1997 the cost, insurance 
and freights price of a Toyota Camry with cubic capacity 2.2 litres was US$ 14,850, 
whereas the domestic price was about 38,000 in US dollars. A Buick Century sold at 
US$20,000 in the United States is sold at RMB370, 000 in China in 1998 (equivalent 
to about US$40,000.) Besides the high-tariff protection, the import of automobile 
parts was restricted by non-tariff measures including quotas and license. China 
adopted a quota and license system for import of automobile products, which account 
for about 60% of the total in the catalogue of quota products. Besides these, The 
Chinese government continued to limit foreign ownership in joint ventures to 50 
percent to give the Chinese partners more control and bargaining power.  
 
China’s protection of its car industry had been a stumbling block in its negotiations 
for WTO accession. In November 1999, Chinese leaders endorsed an agreement with 
the United States under which the U.S. would support China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization in the 2000. The WTO agreement included an explicit 
commitment by the Chinese government to substantially liberalize the restrictions it 
had imposed on automobile imports and on the operation of foreign manufacturers in 
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China. 
 
During the negotiation, the automobile industry has succeeded in arguing for 
preferential treatment. China had resisted demands from industrial economies for 
substantial reductions in automobile tariffs and for the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions over a short period of time. China was permitted to gradually cut its auto 
tariff within five to six years to 25 percent on July 1, 2006. Thus by the middle of 
2006, China had fully implemented its WTO commitments to tariff decreases in the 
automobile industry. Furthermore, some other trade barriers in the car industry, as 
well as an important license system, have been abolished.  
 
Table 1.1 Tariff Rate Deduction Schedule 
Product 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 7/2006 
Vehicles not exceeding 3000cc 43.8% 38.2% 34.2% 30% 28% 25% 
Vehicles exceeding 3000cc 50.7% 43% 37.6% 30% 28% 25% 
Source: Coudert Brothers LLP, Automotive Industry in China, China Auto Conference 2002 
 
1.1.2 Local Protectionism  
Conceptually, according to Mertha (2005), local protectionism refers to trade barriers 
that reduce the sale of goods between localities, thereby preventing the growth of 
significant scale economies. Local protectionism represents a barrier to the creation of 
an efficient, integrated national economy from a mosaic of balkanized local markets 
that establish unfair barriers to entry engage in illegal production and sales, or both.  
  
In the internal market, the car industry in China has also been signed out for ‘special 
treatment’ by lower levels of government-provincial or municipal for many years. At 
provincial government level car industry singled out for special treatment falls in the 
catalogue of ‘infrastructure industries’ or ‘pillar industry’ just as what done as the 
central government. Special treatment has traditionally taken the form of favorable 
financing, for example, open ended, low or no interest loans, favorable regulations, 
assistance in restructuring and restrictions on “foreign” participation. The problems 
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inherent in a special treatment approach are compounded by regional protectionism. 
Local protectionism is a highly visible issue in auto market during the 1990s.  
 
According to the Provisions of the State Council on the Prevention of Regional 
Blockades in Market Economic Activities issued on April 21, 2001, generally there 
are seven kinds of activities that belong to regional blockades: 
1. Prescribing, directly or in a disguised form, that the entities or individuals can only 
operate, purchase or use the local products or can only accept the services provided by 
local or appointed enterprise, economic organizations and individuals; 
2. Setting up barriers to prevent outside products from entering local markets or 
preventing local products from being shipped outside; 
3. Imposing discriminatory standards of charges and discriminatory prices on outside 
products or services; 
4. Making different technical requirements and inspection standards for outside 
products or services of the same kind; 
5. Carrying out discriminatory treatment in relation to outside products or services and 
preventing outside products or services from entering the local market by way of 
franchises, monopolization, examination and approval, and permission, etc.; 
6. Restricting or excluding outside enterprises, other economic organizations or 
individuals from participating in the local bidding by providing discriminatory 
qualification requirements, examination standards or failing to disclose the relevant 
information according to law; 
7. Treating outside enterprises, other economic organizations and individuals 
unequally and discriminatorily in terms of their investment and in the setting up of 
branches. 
 
All the above forms of local protectionism are very common in the auto market. In 
some provinces, protective measures had been adopted to ban sales of cars and 
mini-vans manufactured in other regions, excessive fees and complicated vehicle 
purchase procedures had stifled individual interest in purchasing an automobile whilst 
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manufacturers had often failed to meet the needs of individual consumers in terms of 
product line, price, and management, marketing and sales mechanisms and after sales 
services. Such policies will not be easily overcome as other factors are also at play. 
For example, in 1998, with deflation pushing prices down and consumer demand 
cooling off, the Shanghai municipal government effectively mandated that all taxicabs 
in the city must be locally produced Volkswagen Santana and then tried to block sales 
of the Xiali produced by Tianjin Automotive Industries and the Fukang produced by 
Dongfeng Citroen in Hubei by imposing extra taxes and fees totaling upward of 
RMB80000 per vehicle, almost doubling the costs of the Xiali and the Fukang. 
Authorities in Hubei retaliated by slapping a variety of taxes on the Santana, including 
a RMB70000 fee for the “relief of enterprises in extreme difficulty”, which drives its 
retail price from RMB172000 to RMB326000. The Hubei government, however, 
offered to withdraw the fee if Shanghai cut its de facto tariff on the Fukang. Faced 
with the possibility of losing access to Hubei, where sales of the Santana amounted to 
55 percent of total sales, Shanghai announced in December 1999 that it would 
eliminated the higher licensing fee for cars produced outside of the city. The following 
years, Hubei-based Sanjiang Renault had to halt sales of its vans in Jiangxi after the 
provincial authorities imposed fees that increased their price 15 percent and left them 
unable to compete with vans produced within the province. In the spring of 2000, the 
municipal government in Xi’an was reportedly using discriminatory taxes to block 
sales of “imported” taxis and ensure sales of locally produced automobiles.  
 
Besides the above mentioned obvious market restrictions, many provinces took 
obscure or indirect measures to protect local auto market. A key feature of the 1994 
automotive industry policy is its encouragement of the consumption of private 
economy vehicles that match the country's relative low purchasing power. However, 
many local governments were discouraging private citizens from buying cars by 
placing restrictions on the use of small, domestically produced cars. They imposed 
taxes and fees on car owners, banned traffic and restricted the number of parking 
places. Since the establishment of the automotive industry policy, the automobile 
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sector has been expanding rapidly, which might be too fast compared with the 
development of roads. As a result, travel is slower, and traffic jams are a constant 
phenomenon in big cities. The urban traffic management authorities tried to cut traffic 
volume by restricted private economy cars. For example, Beijing's municipal traffic 
authorities issued a dec ree limiting urban road-riding of Jeeps, light buses and sedans 
with engines smaller than 1.0 litres to every other day, according to license plate 
numbers. Most vehicles were domestically made economy cars. For economy-car 
producers, such restrictions were pretexts for local protectionism. For example, in 
Beijing, locally made Cherokee Jeeps were not restricted. In Shanghai, authorities 
stipulated that cars with an engine capacity of more than 1.6 litres could be used as 
taxis, thereby squeezing out small domestic cars, mainly the Xiali cars manufactured 
in Tianjin. Dalian followed the same policy of Shanghai; Tianjin restricted the use of 
mini-vans in some districts. In Wuhan, buyers of the local Citroen ZX (Fukang) 
enjoyed significant fee reductions not available to owners of other brands. Dalian, 
Guangzhou, Ningbo and many other cities has similar policies. It is no coincidence 
that the Guangzhou's largest taxpayer is Guangzhou Automobile Group’s Honda 
Accord and Toyota Camry, Beijing is Beijing Hyundai, Shanghai is Shanghai 
Volkswagen and GM, and Wuhan is Citroen. Quite likely, such measures were meant 
to boost the local automotive industry's growth. But when obsessed with their own 
vested interests, they might fail to see the whole picture, crippling the automotive 
industry.  
 
Under such circumstances, it is only right that the central government steps in to 
resolve the problems. Its intervention would prevent freewheeling local authorities 
from fragmenting the market and freezing the industry's development. The increasing 
tension of regional protectionism caused tremendous concern from the central 
government while the tariffs began to de-escalate. The issue of a package of laws and 
regulations in recent years has put an end to many means used to block the market1.  
                                                        
1
 “Law on Unjust Competition” approved in 1993, and the State Council No. 303 Order, “Stipulation of the State 
Council to Forbid Regional Blockade in Market Economic Activities”, issued in 2001. In 2003, State Development 
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In December 2005, six central government ministries further issued a joint notice 
eliminating all local government restrictions on small cars - defined as those with fuel 
capacity of less than 1.6 litres - starting on March 31, 2006. However, uncertainty 
remains about the effectiveness of the Chinese government's directives because they 
didn’t clarify penalties for local governments, and lack a deadline. Certainly the 
automobile industry has a long way to go. There are still many important issues 
required for academic study. An important question is that whether China’s car market 
is integration. Or in other words, whether the existing of various local protectionism 
has blocked the process of market integration? 
 
After checking the car retail price data provided by the China Price Information 
Center (CPIC), I do find significant price differences for cars among cities in China. 
For some car models, the maximum price difference can exceed 10% or even more at 
the same time. In general, for the same model, as time goes by the price differences 
among cities do diminish, in particular, for the newer introduced models after China’s 
WTO accession.  
 
In the context of this study, I will investigate the auto market performance by studying 
the impact of deregulation on market prices, prices spreads and market volatility in 
the domestic car market in China. A review of the literature showed that no study has 
been specifically conducted to measure the extent of market integration and price 
transmission in the China market.  
 
1.2 Compare with Previous Study within EU  
During the past two decades, car prices in Europe Union member countries were 
characterized by large and persistent difference despite the development of a single 
market there; therefore research on car price dispersion becomes an interesting issue 
                                                                                                                                                               
and Reform Commission together with other eight ministries jointed issued the “Notice on Campaign to Rectify 
Auto Market” to examine and abolish discriminative local provisions or policies that favor market monopoly by 
local auto manufacturers.  
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to study on the European car market. These price differences had been the focus of 
intense public debate in Europe at the beginning. Consumer organizations and 
automakers gave their explanations from the role of geographical segmentation to 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
The automobile industry also provides an opportunity for studying price convergence 
within both EU and EMU countries. A considerable number of studies aimed to assess 
the presence and importance of international price differentials, using different 
measurement methodologies. At the same time, efforts have been made to explain the 
causes of the observed price differentials.   
  
To date, there has been little research on market segmentation of auto market other 
than the Europe Unions. The lack of study on this issue in the intranational context is 
probably because the following three reasons. 
 
First, in contrast with other goods such as corns or gasoline in market, cars 
demonstrated great or unbounded specification differences among markets and 
models. The variability does make it often to confuse whether cars with the same 
name are identical goods among markets or regions. For instance, in United Kingdom, 
carmakers often provide more luxury equipments for the same model than in other EU 
members. That’s why most of studies focusing on European market applied hedonic 
price methods.  
 
Second, in many countries, such as the United States, interregional trade barriers are 
prohibited by law or the central government effectively. That is why though there 
exists a lot of research on car price in the United States, most of which are 
concentrated on industrial organization theory.  
 
Third, transportation cost has been identified to play important roles in many studies 
focusing on the law of one price. There are very few countries or single economies 
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can display vast geographical disparities among regions in the sectoral distribution of 
economic activity, living standards and governmental administration.  
 
The case of China is different as it provides us with a unique opportunity to study 
market segment theory. 
 
First, comparing with the Europe Union, China is a single uniform country with a 
powerful central authority2. In this case, border effects and exchange rates cannot play 
the same roles in the possible interregional price dispersion as they did in the 
European car markets. Furthermore, we do not need to consider the hedonic price 
method to take into account the difference of specification for the same model sold in 
different regions.  
 
Second, the automotive market in China represents an even more extraordinary case 
of development than other industry sectors. The whole automotive industry, which 
had more than 120 plants, only produced about 0.25 million unit cars in 1994. By the 
end of 2006 the production of cars had reached more than 3.87 million units and it is 
expected to grow even more quickly in the 2007 according to recently XINHUA 
Report. The number of private owned cars in China has increased to 13.83 million in 
2005 from 0.78 million in 1994. In 2006, private customers accounted for a more than 
53% of total sales nationwide. 
 
[Insert Figure 1.1 here] 
Third and most important, domestic competition is a very controversial issue in China. 
We often see some phenomena being criticized as anecdotal evidence for local 
protectionism in China, especially in auto market. Academically, some scholars 
describe China’s economy as deeply segmented, with local protectionism imposing 
stringent limits on domestic trade. However, there are also some recent studies which 
                                                        
2
 However, china’s transition to markets has long been associated with the devolution of authority from the central 
to local governments. See Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995), Chang and Wang (1998), Xu and Zhuang 
(1998)). 
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show that intra-provincial trade barriers have decline.3 
 
1.3 Outline of the Study  
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the theoretical background of market 
integration analysis of spatially separated markets. Chapter 3 provides an industry 
overview that uses the structure, conduct and performance method. In chapter 4 
reviews recent literature one auto market convergence within EU, Law of one price in 
general commodities, and previous studies about China’s economy segmentations. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical method used in this study is discussed, while Chapter 
6 considers various specifications of unit root tests, and reports my findings. To 
summarize my results, I find evidence in favor of market convergence for majority of 
car models in China’s auto market when apply panel unit root test and nonlinear unit 
root tests support convergence more often than linear unit tests. In Chapter 6 
conclusions and limitations of this study are provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 See Li Shantong et al.(2004) for comprehensive survey on Chinese domestic regional protectionism 
See also C. Simon Fan and Xiangdong Wei (2006) 
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Chapter 2 the Theories of the Law of One Price 
2.1 General Theory  
The intranational law of one price (henceforth LOOP), as the basis of intranational 
“purchasing power parity” (PPP) for individual goods is an empirical proposition that 
in competitive markets, free of transportation costs and public barriers to trade (such 
as tariffs), identical goods sold in different locations must sell for the same price when 
their price are expressed in terms of the same currency (Krugman and Obstfeld (2006), 
p.395). 
 
There is an important distinction between the LOOP and the more familiar Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) condition. The key aspect distinguishing LOOP from the more 
familiar Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is the use of a large data set on the prices of 
individuals traded goods instead of aggregated indexes. Wile the LOOP arbitrage 
relation is postulated to hold for the prices of individual commodities, PPP is said to 
hold if the postulated holds for all products within country or among countries. If 
LOOP holds true for every commodity PPP must hold automatically. On the other 
hand, validity of PPP does not require the law of one price to hold exactly. Therefore, 
the LOOP is more restrictive than PPP. This has several advantages over aggregate 
data. First the absolute version of the LOOP can be tested. Second, potential biased 
due to index weights, varying based periods and no-traded goods do not distort the 
analysis. Third, the identical goods assumption can be examined and the price data 
adjusted accordingly. Fourth, price differences have a direct interpretation and allow 
attaching a value to potential arbitrage gains. Fifth, the effect of arbitrage barriers on 
price differences can be assessed directly. 
 
The reason why LOOP must hold is arbitrage, which means that if in region A there is 
a demand shock for some good that causes the price of the good in location A to rise, 
there will be a possibility to buy the good at a lower price in another location, such as 
region B and sell it for a higher price in region A; Therefore, the effect of higher 
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demand will be eliminated by additional supply. In a perfectly integrated economy, 
were there are no obstacles for the movement of goods among different regions and 
all markets are competitive, arbitrage is costless (means no transportation costs), and 
the supply of goods will be perfectly elastic in each regions. This is because any 
increase in demand of some product in region A will be satisfied by an instant inflow 
of the product from other regions. 
 
While the idea is strongly rooted in appealing economic intuition, empirical analysis 
notoriously fail to establish support for it in the data; price differentials tend to remain 
persistent over time. This failure to detect price convergence among different 
countries undermined confidence in a wide range of open macro models that assumed 
some version of the law of one price. “The difficulties researchers had in rejecting a 
random walk model for PPP deviations on modern floating rate data was something of 
an embarrassment. Every reasonable theoretical model suggests that there should be at 
least some temporary component to PPP deviations.” (Rogoff, 1996, p.655) Therefore, 
there is great interest in determining factors that cause persistent deviations from the 
LOOP, which exactly is one of the aims of this paper. 
  
The theory described in following part builds upon the framework of Gluschenko 
(2002). Let’s consider a perfectly integrated economy; by such is meant an economy 
in which there are not any economic, physical, and administrative obstacles to the 
movement of goods among regions. The absence of economic obstacles implies, 
among other things, that arbitrage is costless. The usual assumption of instantaneous 
arbitrage applies well. Clearly, in such an ideal economy, the LOOP holds at every 
point since any small deviation from the equilibrium will be instantly eliminated by 
perfect arbitrage. Therefore the perfectly integrated economy may be considered as an 
economy in which the LOOP holds. 
 
For the convenience of subsequent formalization, let us simplify the country further. 
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Let it consist of only two regions, j and k , and there is only one product i . The 
prices of which in these locations are denoted as jP  and kP . Both the two markets 
are perfectly competitive. It is also assumed that j  is a relative small region of the 
country, and k  is the rest of the country, which means any possible supply provided 
by local producers is negligibly smaller in region j  than those quantities in region 
k . Arbitrage transaction costs per unit of good (marginal costs of arbitrage) are 
denoted as C ; since arbitrage is perfect, 0C = . Income per capital, jI , will be 
considered as the only factor, besides price, determining demand in region j , so 
that ( , )j j jQ D P I= . ( , )j jD P I monotonically decreases in price, and monotonically 
increases in income.  
 
With these assumptions, supply in j  will be absolutely elastic as any increase in 
demand in j  will be opposed by an instant flow of good from k  , and a decrease 
will cause an instant outflow to k ; thus jP  is permanently maintained to be on the 
level j kP P= . Figure 2.1 illustrate illustrates different equilibria in a perfectly 
integrated market. ( S  labeling the supply curve) 
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As the figure clearly demonstrates, with perfect arbitrage the same price kP  
corresponds to each demand in region j  (hence, to income jI ). Thus, the absence of 
the dependence of local price on local demand is a necessary condition for the LOOP 
to hold. Hence, any relationship between the relative price and demand in region j   
points to a violation of the LOOP, so indicating that there are some barriers in the way 
of commodity flows between j  and k , and thus the economy is not integrated.  
 
At this point, let us allow for such barriers. Barriers are considered as fully 
characterized by arbitrage transaction costs 0C >  (with a broader definition of 
transaction costs, these may also involve barriers of non-economic nature, e.g., 
administrative ones). In such an economy, arbitrage is no longer able to equalize 
prices in j  and k  as arbitrage occurs only if the price difference exceeds costsC , 
otherwise arbitrage turns out to be unprofitable. As soon as demand becomes such that 
local producers would supply the good at the price exceeding KP C+ , deliveries from 
k  become profitable, thus beating the price back down to kP C+ . Therefore total 
supply turns out to be absolutely elastic in the section 2jQ Q≥ . When demand falls 
E1 E3 E2 
D(I1) D(I2) D(I3) 
S
Figure 2.1 Market Equilibrium in a Local Market with Perfect Arbitrage 
Pj 
Pk 
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to a quantity such that the good will have to be sold at a price below kP C− , the 
price fixes itself at the level kP C− , since all quantities that do not meet demand at 
this price can be exported to k , and be sold at price kP . Thus, supply is absolutely 
elastic in the section 1jQ Q<  as well. If demand is such that the equilibrium price is 
confined between the bonds k j kP C P P C− ≤ ≤ + , then arbitrages are unprofitable. 
In this case, local producers supply the entire demand, and their entire output is sold 
in the local market, the total supply coinciding with curve LS  between 1Q  and 2Q . 
Thus a persistent difference in price jP  and kP  appears. Figure 2 illustrates the 
situation ( S  labeling the supply curve while LS  labeling the supply curve of local 
producers in region j ). 
 
 
 
 
 
There exist several potential explanations for the failure in the law of one price. These 
primarily include transportation costs, different currencies with sticky prices, labor 
D(I1) 
 E1 
E2 
D(I2) 
E3 SL 
D(I3) 
S 
Pj 
   Pk+C 
Pk 
Pk-C 
Q2 Q1 Qj 
Figure 2.2 Market Equilibrium in a Local Market with Imperfect Arbitrage 
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market segmentation, tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, fluctuations in nominal 
exchange rates, productivity differentials, pricing to market, aggregation bias etc. it is 
more likely instead that some combination of them provides the answer. By focusing 
on the degree of persistence in relative price differentials across cities within a single 
country, the approach this paper adopts testing the law of one price plays down the 
importance of most of the above explanations. Indeed, the implied speed of 
convergence in this context is expected to be faster than in studies testing the absolute 
law of one price in international price data. An alternative interpretation of the law of 
one price is that equilibrium price differentials exist, but there is a relatively fast 
convergence to them over time. The time invariant component of price differentials 
may in turn depend on the relative economic development of locations and the 
distance between them.  
 
2.2 Two Versions of LOOP 
There are two types of LOOP. This first is the absolute law of one price. Let 
, ,i j tp  
and 
, ,i k tp  be prices of good i  at time t  in regions j  and k respectively. Then 
according to the absolute version of LOOP: 
, ,
, ,
1i j t
i k t
p
p
=                                                                 (2.1) 
 
The relative LOOP only requires that the rate of price change of good i  in both 
regions should be the same. In this sense it is less restrictive. However, the absolute 
LOOP is less likely to hold in practice because of transportation costs and trade 
barriers. There are some difficulties associated with the relative LOOP. The relative 
LOOP may hold because: 
A. Absolute prices are equal in all periods; the LOOP holds in all periods, which 
means: 
, , , ,i j t i k tp p=  and , , 1 , , 1i j t i k tp p− −=                                         (2.2) 
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B. Changes of prices in both locations are equal, which means  
, , , ,
, , 1 , , 1
i j t i k t
i j t i k t
p p
p p
− −
=                                                          (2.3) 
 
Therefore, if the available data is in the form of price indexes, it will be impossible to 
distinguish which relationship holds exactly. In addition, price indexes are not 
appropriate for testing the absolute LOOP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 18 
Chapter 3 Industrial Backgrounds 
3.1 An Overview of the Auto Industry  
As China began to open itself to world trade and its economic reform in the late 1970s, 
change in its car industry emerged as an important part of the country’s modernization 
drive. Both the infant passenger car industry and the relatively well-developed truck 
manufacturing sector faced new policies as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
revitalization plans.  
 
The passenger car industry was a minor part of vehicle production during the first 
three decades of China’s socialist economy. As late as 1985, the country produced a 
total of only 5200 cars.4 During the pre-reform era, the strategy for developing the 
economy as a whole gives priority to the development and growth of heavy industry. 
Further, both the city residents and government officials were discouraged from using 
private vehicles. The dearth of tourism and lack of disposable income among Chinese 
citizens also meant there was a low demand for taxis and other cars as means of local 
transportation. With an opening to international tourism and foreign business in the 
early 1980s, and relaxation of rules on perquisites for government officers, the need 
for car grew quickly. As domestic production could not meet the demand, imports rose 
dramatically, despite a 260 percent tariff on foreign cars. The country spent some $3 
billion to import more than 350,000 vehicles (including 106,000 cars and 111,000 
trucks) in 1985 alone.  
 
China’s answer to the growing demand and surging import wave was to encourage 
foreign investors to enter into join ventures with state companies: 
1. In 1983, American Motors Corporation (AMC, later acquired by Chrysler 
Corporation) signed a 20-year contract to produce their Jeep-model vehicles in 
Beijing.  
2. In the following year of 1984, Germany’s Volkswagen signed a 25-year contract 
                                                        
4
 1996 Automotive Industry of China (Beijing: Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 1996), P. 12. 
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to produce car in Shanghai and then with First Auto Works (FAW) in Changchun 
7 years after.  
3. Also in 1984, France’s Peugeot signed an agreement for another car project to 
make car in the prosperous southern city of Guangzhou. 
4. Japanese producers Suzuki and Daihatsu signed technology licensing agreements 
with TAIC (Tianjin Auto Industry Corporation) and Chongqing Chang’an 
machine factory to produce sub-compact models (Xiali 1.0 and Alto1.0) in mid 
1980s. 
 
Though joint venture agreements provided a window for foreign manufacturers to tap 
the Chinese market, there were limits on their participation. Foreign firms made 
investments oriented to market access rather than to operation efficiency. There were 
strict limits on joint ventures set by the Chinese government: foreign partners could 
purchase at most 50% share of assembly operations (e.g. Volkswagen’s ventures took 
the up of 50 percent foreign ownership with SAIC in Shanghai and 40 percent with 
FAW in Changchun respectively). Furthermore, in principle a joint venture could 
assemble only one model or produce one type of parts, and could form partners with 
at most two Chinese companies. Car manufacturers were also given incentives and 
pressures to source parts from Chinese suppliers, with a 40 percent local-content rate 
bestowing reduced parts import duties of some 30 percent on the foreign partner.5The 
Chinese side also kept control of distribution networks for the jointly-produced 
automobiles. 
 
The various incentives, combined with maintenance of import tariff duties, helped 
achieve success for at least some of the new joint venture companies. For example, 
with help from the Shanghai municipal government, which bought much of the output 
for taxis and municipal vehicles, and assessed a surcharge on sales to support a new 
localization fund to strengthen local parts suppliers, VW eventually captured half of 
                                                        
5
 At 60% local content, the import duty fell to 24% and 80% local content meant only at 16% import tax. See 
Harwit (2001), “The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China” 
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the Chinese market for cars. Volkswagen’s Shanghai plant was the biggest winner 
under the regime. As car imports fell to some 34,000 in 1990, Shanghai-Volkswagen’s 
(SVW) production of its Santana models reached nearly 19,000 cars that year. By 
1993, the output of SVW had reached 100,000 cars. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
In 1994, inspired by soaring motor vehicle output, which had tripled since 1991, and 
the apparent success of Japan and Korea in the industry, the state Council 
promulgated its first industry-specific policy document, more than ten years after the 
announcement of the first joint venture and subsequent formation of three other major 
joint ventures. The automotive industry policy anticipated a shift in demand toward 
car purchases by households from institutions, and reiterated the call for long-run 
consolidation into three to four groups akin to the “Big Three” model in the US, and 
with an emphasis placed on the ability to compete internationally. The policy also 
covered local content requirements, pollution and environmental considerations, 
conditions for the approval of foreign investment and so on. The policy contained an 
aggressive schedule for the development of the Chinese automotive industry, and was 
further amended in 2004. 
 
Table 3.2 Stages of the 1994 Automotive Industry Policy 
Stage  Description 
1994-1996 “Foundation” Stage: Approved projects of light weight vehicles and passenger 
cars to commence production; the development of the components industry; 
vehicles to have a local content of 60-80% 
1997-2000 “Attacking Difficulties” Stage: The target output for 2000 was 2.7 million 
vehicles, of which 1.35 million were to comprise passenger cars. The intention 
was fro there to be two or three large-scale automobile groups and six or seven 
“backbone” automobile enterprises. Basic R&D capabilities were to be 
established  
2000-2010 “Rapidly Developing” Stage: The target output for 2010 was 6.0 million per 
year, of which 4.0 million were to be passenger cars. The industry was to be 
self sufficient for product development and competitive by international 
standards 
Source: Holweg et al. (2005) 
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Unlike Korea, however, China refrained from utilizing either administrative 
compulsion or massive policy loans to favor key enterprises. The main effect of the 
policy was not domestic consolidation but a competitive rush by foreign auto 
assemblers and parts firms to enter the Chinese market and to establish a favorable 
position before China entered the WTO. With the 1994 Auto Industry Policy, entry to 
the industry was limited in order to foster economies of scale, and to centralize 
resources. The government prohibited car projects other than in the supported 
state-owned enterprises (SOE), which included the so-called “Big Three, Small Three 
&Mini Two” policy that clearly set out which manufacturers were to be sustained. By 
the end of 1990s, government regulation gradually loosened with the rapid growth of 
Chinese market, and then more international automakers poured into this industry to 
capture the fast growing demand for automobiles in China. The key contest came in 
Shanghai, where General Motors (GM) defeated Ford and Toyota to win a license to 
establish a second joint venture (after VW) with SAIC. Stimulated by GM’s entry, 
Shanghai VW invested in the development of new models, pressed the municipal 
government for similar treatment, while the majority of parts firms in Shanghai sought 
out foreign partners to increase the quality of their products to qualify for supplying 
GM (Thun, 2004). Industrial policy and the prospect of WTO entry also spurred 
investment and local development by other big multinational automakers. In 1997, 
Honda took over Peugeot’s troubled joint venture with Guangzhou Automotive 
Manufacturing Company, and then Ford entered negotiations with Chang’An in 1999. 
There was a veritable flood of investment into the Chinese auto industry during 1990s 
from both Chinese government and foreign sources. According to government 
statistics, total investment into the motor-vehicle and related industries from all 
sources totaled nearly US$ 60 billion during the 1990s. After China’s entry into the 
WTO in 2002, virtually all of the major global carmakers and first tier auto suppliers 
had established major operations in China. VW and GM led the way, the three largest 
Japanese carmakers (Toyota, Honda and Nissan) and the two major Korean firms 
(Hyundai and KIA), strove to make up the lost time, while Ford, Daimler-Chrysler 
and the remaining major players tried to maintain themselves in an increasingly 
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crowded and competitive market. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
In November 1999, Chinese leaders endorsed an agreement with the United States 
under which the U.S. would support China’s entry into the World Trade Organization 
in the 2000. The WTO agreement included an explicit commitment by the Chinese 
government to substantially liberalize the restrictions it had imposed on automobile 
imports and on the operation of foreign manufacturers in China. Over the next three to 
six years, the institutional environment and the competitive environment in which 
both domestic and foreign-affiliated manufacturers operated would change 
fundamentally. 
 
Table 3.4 Policies on Automobile Industry: Pre- and Post-WTO Membership 
 Before entry into WTO After entry in WTO 
Tariffs 
 
200 percent in 1980s 
80-100 percent in 1990s 
25 percent by 2006 
Import quotas 
 
 
30,000 vehicles a year 
allowed from foreign 
carmakers 
Quota increased by 15 
percent a year, phased 
out by 2006 
Local content requirement 
 
40 percent in first year of 
production;60 percent and 80 
percent in 2nd and 3rd years 
No local-content 
requirement  
Auto financing for Chinese 
domestic consumers  
 
Foreign non-bank financial 
institutions prohibited from 
providing financing  
Foreign, non-bank 
financing permitted in 
selected cities prior to 
gradual national rollout 
Foreign participation in 
sales and distribution 
Limited to wholesaling 
through joint ventures; 
prohibited form consolidating 
sales organizations of imports, 
joint ventures 
Will by 2006 be allowed 
to own vehicle 
wholesale, retail 
organizations, integrated 
sale organizations  
Sauce: KPMG, China’s automotive and components market 2004 
 
As China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, international 
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automobile giants paid a great deal of attention to the development of China’s 
automobile industry, increasing their investments and production capacity, and offered 
their most recent products and latest technologies when embarking upon a cooperative 
project. On the other hand, major Chinese automobile groups, with the involvement of 
international automotive companies and by means of restructuring, joint production 
and merging, etc., have enhanced their ability in areas such as total production scale, 
product offering and product quality.  
 
The Tenth Five-Year Plan for the Automotive Industry, issued in June 2001, 
emphasized the restructuring of China’s automotive industry. It clearly indicated 
China’s intention to turn its automotive industry into an internationally competitive 
one within the next decade. The plan stated that the guiding principles for the 
development of the automotive industry would be to persist in opening to the outside 
world while “boosting independent development capabilities”. 
 
Table 3.5 Aims of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Automotive Industry 
1 Simplify and standardize automobile purchase, registration and operation 
procedures. 
2 Adjust consumption tax rates on automobiles, reduce the overall tax rate, and 
implement a gasoline tax; 
3 Set uniform national fees for the purchase and operation of vehicles, and abolish 
unreasonable fees; 
4 Permit foreign financial institutions to provide auto loans to Chinese customers; 
 
5 Permit foreign financial institutions to provide auto loans to Chinese customers; 
 
6 Revoke local protectionist policies; 
 
7 Deny access for foreign used cars to the domestic market; 
 
8 Promulgate the Law on Roads and Automobiles and other rules for automobile 
makers. 
Source: Satyaprakash (2004) 
 
Contrary to the expectations of many analysts, China’s auto market boomed in the 
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years immediately following accession to the WTO. In just two years, production 
tripled to the considerable total of over two million sedans in 2003, making China one 
of the largest auto producers and markets in the world. In 2003 alone, sales of cars 
grew by more than 50 percent. Among the causes of this unexpected boom were rising 
incomes generated by rapid economic growth, changes in consumption and tax 
policies that encouraged private car ownership, a rapid expansion of the road network; 
and a proliferation of the models available in China due to heightened competition.  
 
In May 2004, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission issued its 
ten-year update to the 1994 Automotive Industry Policy. For the first time, the 
government noted the emerging contradictions between the development of the auto 
industry and the encouragement of auto consumption by individual consumers on the 
one hand, and urban traffic infrastructure and environmental protection on the other 
hand. To resolve these contradictions, the policy states that the industry should 
actively conduct research on electric and hybrid-electric research, technological 
innovation, industrialization of new technologies, and the creation of an enabling 
policy environment for the production and use of hybrid vehicles.  
 
With respect to technological innovation and capacity building, the policy states that 
the industry should continue to abide by the principle of integrating transferred 
technologies with self-developed technologies, and that the state will support R&D 
activities through preferential tax policies.  
 
The other major emphasis in the 2004 policy is continued industry restructuring. The 
objective stated is that automotive enterprises should grow into large-sized 
conglomerates, industrial alliances, and special-purpose vehicle to make the Chinese 
industry more competitive in the world market. For the first time, foreign investors 
will be allowed to control stakes of more than 50 percent in automobile and 
motorcycle joint ventures with Chinese partners if the joint ventures are built in 
China’s export-processing zones and shoot at overseas markets.  
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One of the interesting phenomena happening in the Chinese auto industry is the fast 
development of a few independent indigenous auto makers after the entering of WTO, 
including Chery from Anhui, Geely from Zhejiang, Great Wall from Hebei province 
and etc. Those young and independent companies have been burgeoning like the 
bamboo shoots in the spring in China’s automotive industry. The direct cause is that 
the central government loosened its strict regulation on the car production licenses. 
Therefore many local government capitals, which had been eager to enter the 
profitable Chinese auto market for a long time, were injected into a few new auto 
companies to produce and sell automobiles from around 2001. Combining a high 
proportion of cheap local parts and aging chassis or engines from the Sino-foreign 
joint ventures, the purely domestic companies have been able to offer compact cars at 
prices as much as 50% lower than those of the joint venture companies, making them 
highly appealing in smaller cities and the hinterlands. However, they have also 
developed impressive mid-sized cars recently as well.  
 
In 2003, Geely and Chery, which only began producing cars in the late 1990s, sold 
over 80,000 units each, and began exporting small numbers of cars both in assembled 
and CKD forms. Though their technical capabilities are still limited and they must 
rely on foreign suppliers and designers, these indigenous young players have gained 
more valuable experience in developing their own models than those state-owned 
partners of joint ventures, which only produce models introduced from their foreign 
partners. In this they follow in the tracks of Toyota and Hyundai, which also 
assembled their own packages of foreign parts, designs and licensers rather than 
relying on single foreign partner during their initial stages. . They have also been able 
to use high salaries to lure leading executives and technical experts from SOEs and 
joint ventures. Both Chery and Geely are beginning to invest abroad using their own 
brands. Chery established a joint venture assembly plant in Iran and Russia, signed an 
OEM agreement to produce compact car for Chrysler in 2007, and is looking to invest 
in other developing countries.  
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The combination of market and political pressure from the independent indigenous 
brands stimulated SOEs to begin emphasizing their own independent strategies. 
Shanghai Automotive (SAIC), which had abandoned its traditional Phoenix and 
Shanghai brands while concentrating on the joint ventures with VW and GM, 
acquired a controlling share in the South Korean sport utility producer Ssangyong and 
purchased the rights to produce two of the models of Britain’s last impendent auto 
producer MG Rover. In April 2006 it announced plans to spend over a billion dollars 
to develop new models based on the Rover 75 and produce 200,000 independent cars 
a year by 2010. In mid-2005 First Auto Works (FAW), which had largely abandoned 
its venerable “Hongqi” (Red Flag) brand, announced that it would expand capacity to 
two million units a year by the end of the 11th five year plan in 2010, of which at least 
half would come from its own brands. In March of 2006, Guangzhou Auto, which 
previously had restricted itself to helping its Japanese partners, reluctantly announced 
a goal of selling 25 percent independently-designed cars by 2010. Brilliance Auto, 
BMW’s Chinese partner, also has its independent car division and developed its 
Zhonghua and Zunchi by outsourcing and cooperating with European design 
companies from the beginning. In 2007, Brilliance Auto has signed a contract with its 
Germany dealers to export 250,000 Zunchi to Europe. 
 
By 2005 these domestic brands accounted for 30 percent of the market. The fact that 
these new players have succeeded as catalysts in the industry fundamentally altered 
the terms of competition in the Chinese auto industry.  They are attracting more and 
more attention in the global auto industry. In particular, the operation modes of these 
Chinese domestic players are challenging the long-term rules in the automotive 
industry, like economy of scale, learning effects, technical capability accumulation 
and brand power. Their emergence reflects a few transformative changes in the 
automotive industry, such as specialization, design outsourcing, production 
modularization, globalization and technical diffusion and fusion. They have been a 
positive power to optimize the competition environment and seed up the maturing 
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process of China’s automotive industry.  
 
In 2006, the total car sales in China rose to 3.87 million units by increasing about 1.1 
million from a year earlier. At the end of the same year, China overtook Germany and 
Japan to become the world second largest car market after only the United States. 
 
3.2 Significant Changes of Chinese Market  
3.2.1 The Surging Waves of Private Owner Market 
The shift from institutional customers to private customers has created a market that is 
more discerning. Before the 1985 China did not allow private citizens to purchase 
motor vehicles for personal use and therefore did not develop large scale in car 
production. Privately owned cars were strictly prohibited according to the policy 
before 1979. Cars had long been the prerogatives of a relatively small number of 
high-ranking officials or managers from state-owned companies. When the control on 
private purchase was lifted formally in 1984, the number of private cars began to grow. 
However, car prices in China were far above the average annual income of its citizens, 
making it difficult for private buyers to afford before the early 1990s. The China’s car 
market remained to be largely an “institutional” buyers’ market where government 
institutions, State-owned companies, and taxi fleets rather than individuals are the 
main buyers.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.2 about here] 
A major turn-point came in 1994. Automotive industry was designated as a pillar 
industry by the Chinese government according to its Automotive Industry Policy in 
July this year. It also indicated to encourage individual consumption of privately 
owned cars. Since then the private cars began its growth in China. The amount of 
private passenger cars outstripped 1.14 million in 1995 while the number was 0.78 
million in 1994, 2.3 million in 1998, 8.5 million in 2003 and 13.8 million at the end of 
2006. In 1995 Institutions and Taxis made up 82% of vehicle demand; in 2001 this fell 
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to 50%, with more than 80 percent of micro-cars and compacted cars purchased by 
individuals. The total number of car sold in china in 2003 was 2.02 millions units, of 
which the private car segment was above 75 percent of the total sales, a progression of 
55 percent to the last year. According to the State Development Planning Commission, 
private cars comprised 70 percent of China’s car sales of 2005, and increased to 80% 
in 2006. Projections of rapid growth in car sales are more and more relied on a 
continued acceleration in sales to private buyers. More demanding consumers are 
leading manufacturers to dramatically increase the pace with which new models are 
introduced. In the there years after WTO accession the number of car models 
produced in China increased from 40 to over 120.  
 
3.2.2 The liberalization of Car Prices 
The reform of Chinese domestic market is closely related to the reform of the price 
system, and so did the auto market of China. From a long period, cars were classified 
as in the category of industrial consumption goods. The prices for those kinds of 
goods were firmly held by the state government under the centrally command 
economy. As price reform deepened, the government’s control over the car price had 
been loosened steadily in the past decades. There exist several stages of the 
management policy for homemade car price in the history.  
 
Under the planned economy, the auto manufacturers only needed to finish the 
production plan assigned by the State Planning Commission (SPC). The SPC would 
arrange the production plan, furnish the raw materials and the most important, and 
designate the ultimate consumers for all the products. For producers, there was no 
need to consider the relation between supply and demand in the market. As a result, 
the car price for the same model was unified nationwide by the SPC during this 
period. 
During 1984-1988, the government pursued expansionary macroeconomic policies 
that resulted in gradually increasing inflation. The two-track system (plan price and 
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market price existed at the same time) with mandatory quota had been introduced to 
auto market. The market was extremely unstable under duo-track price system. The 
price was going to be disintegrated by unappeasable craving from the market for the 
first time. Take the case of BJ212 (the main product of Beijing Jeep before the 
introduction of XJ Cherokee), there existed four kinds of price in the market in 1988: 
the planed price was RMB28, 000, RMB32, 200 for the floating price, while the 
wholesale price from materials circulation sector was RMB35, 600, and the retail 
price was RMB38, 000 to private consumers in the market. 
 
The SPC re-strengthened the price control of sedans by announcing “Measures for the 
implementation on strengthening the administration of sedan sales” in March 1989. 
According to it, the factory and retail prices of each sedan model were made by the 
State Bureau of Price together with departments concerned. The countrywide unified 
retail prices were base on the factory prices for each model, then plus the selling 
expenses and taxes and fees. The unified prices were adjusted according to the 
exchange rate fluctuations and the raising localization rates from 1989 to 1994. 
 
New round price mechanism reform began in 1995. The SPC had set base prices for 
domestic cars, but allowed enterprises to adjust these prices by 10% based o 
benchmark levels in either direction since 1995. Some Chinese industry observers 
alleged that this policy had created a “price floor” for domestic producers, 
maintaining high prices even in the fact of domestic overcapacity since 1994. 
However, the policy was not resolutely carried out by domestic automakers, with the 
fact that the problem of overcapacity became even more serious in the following years. 
In fact, the government had given tacit consent to domestic carmakers’ dozens of 
price cuts since 1994.  
 
There have been fierce reductions in the price of cars as the tariffs began to reduce, 
the price control began to decontrolled and competitive pressure intensified since 
1994. Major local carmakers, such as the FAW, Tianjin Automotive Industry Corp, 
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Shanghai Volkswagen slashed the price of their products since 1994. The steady price 
cuts dramatically boosted the consumption and extended the market scale. For 
example, the Santana LX, the best continued selling vehicle, cost RMB168, 000 plus 
extra U.S. $9100 in January 1994 according to the guided price. In March of 2000, the 
price of Santana LX was below RMB110, 000 and no foreign exchange required. In 
early 2000, a series of ‘car wars’ erupted as producers began to cut prices in hope to 
expanding market share and disposing of excess inventory. In January, 
Dongfeng-Citroen cut the price of its Fukang cars. Tianjin Automotive responded by 
reducing prices for its Xiali Cars. Several months later, Shanghai GM cut the price of 
its Buick Sail while Chang’an Suzuki cut the price of its car. Soon thereafter, 
Shanghai Volkswagen knocked RMB10, 000 off the price of its Santana and lowered 
prices for the Passat, leading Dongfeng Citroen to further reduce the price of the 
Fukang and FAW-VW to cut the price of its Volkswagen Jetta. Tianjin Automotive 
also dropped the price of the Xiali still further.  
 
Figure 3.3 the Price Movement of Shanghai-VW’s Santana  
 
On May 21 2001, the State Planning Commission (SPC) announced the elimination of 
price regulation for domestic cars and allowed carmakers full latitudes within the 
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system. Since then, automakers of china finally and formally were granted the right to 
price their products according to market conditions. 
 
3.2.3 from Underproduction to Overcapacity 
Indeed, China’s automotive industry is surging as the newest player in the global 
landscape, following the trail blazed by the U.S., Europe, Japan and South Korea. 
China’s car market flourished in 1996, when deregulation allowed the entrance of 
foreign OEMs, and it began to heat up in 2001, when WTO entry loosened tariff 
regulations, effectively lowering prices and stimulated competition. The explosive 
growth peaked in 2003, when passenger car sales increased by 65 percent over 2002, 
fueled by increasing private consumption. However, the problem of overcapacity had 
existed for long under the superficies of this exceptionally boom for long time. The 
overcapacity was often viewed as one of the reasons for price drops in the whole 
industry. One of the key reasons for overcapacity was that foreign manufacturers had 
constantly overestimated the size of China’s market. The reality was that the 
automobile market did not grow as fast as they expected, especially in a weak global 
economic environment after the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Another reason 
comes from speculation. A critical distribution problem faced by carmakers was 
rampant speculation: dealers would order an excess number of cars from a plant, hold 
them to consumers at an inflated prices-keeping the profit for themselves. Sometimes 
speculators would bet wrong: what appeared to the factory to be a spike in sales 
would into a glut at the dealerships. In addition to depriving consumers of affordable 
cars, such speculation leaves carmakers with little sense of real demand and real 
inventory. It allows them no way to offer uniform prices nationwide-or even 
city-wide. 
 
Just as China finally succeeded entering the WTO in late 2001, demand for autos 
accelerated, creating high profits and higher expectations. To cool its overheated 
economy after WTO accession, Chinese government paused private loans and 
increased car restrictions and fees in 2003. For example, the government imposed 
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significant license fees, registration permits, and proof of a parking location prior to 
purchasing a car. It worked. Demand simmered down. Given huge ongoing 
investments by OEMs, the drop in demand caused by overcapacity, which forced 
OEMs to sharply cut production and cut prices further. Regardless, they continued to 
build capacity, even as they had a hard time absorbing it. Local firms, too, poured into 
the auto industry, pulled by the high profits and pushed by excess capacity in other 
industries such as motorcycles and the desire of local political leaders to expand their 
economies. A number of China’s numerous truck and pickup producers also tried to 
move into the rapidly growing market for passenger cars. At the end of 2006, the state 
government further released a circular upon the restructuring of the nation's 
automotive industry in a bid to put a clamp on its overcapacity. The circular raised the 
threshold for new complete vehicle projects. Complete vehicle manufacturers are 
permitted to kick off new projects if their sales in the previous year accounted for over 
80 percent of their approved capacity. Manufacturers' built capacity, which has not 
gained regulatory approval yet, will be given the light if they sold no less than 
100,000 sedans, 50,000 SUVs or 50,000 MPVs in the previous year.  
 
The massive amount of investment in production by both foreign and domestic firms 
over the last five years translates into more severe overcapacity. According to 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), auto production capacity in 
2010 expected to be more than two times of the market demand. Production capacity 
is currently estimated to be 8 million units a year and expected to hit 10 million in 
2007, further the current plans by foreign and domestic producers will increase this 
number to 16 million vehicles by 2011. The glut of capacity, combined with cuts in 
tariffs, intensified the competition, forced auto firms to reduce prices, cutting deeply 
into profitability. Despite the increasing rigors of competition and the ominous drop in 
profitability, the demand of Chinese market still has strong growth and continually to 
expand. The returns to those that can hang in should be huge. The Japanese and 
Koreans, who are grabbing market share, have every reason to continue expanding 
capacity. Once-dominant VW has lost a huge share of the market, and GM is 
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potentially vulnerable, but each is losing more badly to the Asian makers elsewhere, 
so they are determined to hold onto China. Local officials will do everything in their 
power to keep firms in their jurisdictions from exiting the market. Thus, all players in 
China, OEMs, and the newly younger local producers are likely to face increasing 
competitive pressures from China. 
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Chapter 4 Related Empirical Literatures 
Three streams of literature will be reviewed in this chapter. The first stream is 
research on market Integration en bloc; research focused on European car market is 
the second steam; those studies on China’s market integration are the last. I will try to 
identify and demonstrate the limitations and gaps in the existing literature when it 
comes to understanding the complex factors that effect china’s auto markets.  
 
4.1 Research of Goods Market Integration  
Research on goods markets has focused on differences in the size of intranational and 
international trade flows as well as price dispersion within and across countries. 
Typically, there is much more trade in goods between regions and cities within a 
country, than between countries-many barriers and distortions to trade are usually 
mush smaller inside a country. Thus, regional data allows the elimination of three 
major sources of deviation from the LOOP: exchange rate, tariffs and border. 
Moreover, intranational violations of the LOOP may matter more than international 
editions because the former are more likely to involve substantial regional quantity 
imbalances and, thus resource misallocations, which is of particular concern to the 
national policy makers. In addition, differences in cost of living between regions are 
important because the system of transfer payments may not take them into account.  
 
McCallum (1995), Anderson and Smith (1999), Wolf (2000), Nitsch (2000), and 
Ceglowski (2003) for instance, have found a surprisingly large border effect by 
controlling for distance and other geographic variables (a dummy is used to 
distinguish between cross-border and internal trade flows). However, the results were 
strongly influenced by the approximate measures of intranational distances and 
remoteness. There is clearly considerable disagreement as to the size of the border 
effect.  
 
In an influential set of papers, Engel and Rogers (1996, 2000, and 2001) found that 
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even after controlling for distance, there was a substantial difference in prices across 
the U.S.-Canadian border. Parsley and Wei (2001) also found large border effect by 
performing a similar exercise on U.S.-Japanese data. McCallum (1995) found that 
intranational trade flows were 22 times larger than international trade flows. In a 
similar vein, provincial borders in Canada (Helliwell and Verdier, 2001) and state 
borders in the U.S.A. (Wolf, 2000) accounted for a significant fraction of the 
decreased trade flows across provinces and states relative to trade flows within states 
and provinces. In a study including the EU countries, Nitsch (2000) also came to the 
conclusion that the economic borders matter less in Europe than across the other 
OECD countries and demonstrated in addition that the border effect had declined over 
time. Furthermore, Ceglowski (2003) found that provincial borders in Canada 
accounted for a significant fraction of the discrepancy of prices across provinces. This 
has important welfare implications and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) include the border 
effect in their list of the major puzzles in international economics. 
 
In the absence of any barriers or costs to the movement of goods, price differences 
expressed in a common currency between comparable items in different locations 
would be quickly eroded. However, due to natural (transportation, information and 
other transactions costs) and administrative impediments (e.g. differences in local tax 
rates) prices generally differ within countries, let alone across borders where far more 
significant trade barriers usually prevail. Indeed, the failure of the law of one price to 
hold in cross-border trade has been well documented by various studies. 
 
Focusing on Canadian provinces and US States, Engel and Rogers (1996 ) found 
again a border effect on the variance of relative prices (over time), which was very 
large as compared to distance and by far too large to be explained by any remaining 
trade barriers. As with the empirical research on trade flows, distance captured again 
transport and information costs. While taking into account differences in costs (wages) 
across regions reduces the effect of distance on price variability, it does not affect the 
border effect. On the other hand, mark-ups appeared to fluctuate widely with 
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exchange rate changed and cross-border prices mainly moved along with the 
exchange rate. 
 
Using aggregate CPI data for 55 cities across 11 European countries, Engel and 
Rogers (2000) estimated how much of the border effect could be accounted for by 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations. The results indicated that controlling for currency 
swings indeed reduced substantially the size of the border coefficient, even though the 
latter still remained significant. This is taken as evidence that the deviations from the 
law of one price are largely explained by pricing-to-market strategies whereby prices 
set in local currencies are adjusted only gradually and infrequently, implying a very 
low exchange rate pass-through in the short term. For exporting firms, such pricing 
behavior implies a high sensitivity of mark-ups to nominal exchange rate fluctuations, 
compensated, however, by lower menu costs and a reduced risk of facing permanent 
market share losses. In distinguishing between the two types of border effects, Engel 
and Rogers concluded that the stickiness of prices and volatility of exchange rates 
mattered more than the “real” barriers highlighted in the aforementioned studies 
focusing on trade volumes. 
 
Besides pricing-to-market practices, significant price differences between similar 
items could also reflect the capacity by producers in some sectors to price 
discriminate across national markets, allowing them to capture a share of the 
consumer surplus. The latter can be substantial in the case of high value-added items, 
in particular when important differences in living standards lead to cross-market 
variations in the price elasticity of demand. Sizeable and persistent mark-up 
adjustments, for instance, seem to have a strong effect on car price differences across 
the EU countries (Goldberg and Verboven, 1998, 2003). However, such practices can 
only persist if there are trade barriers in the form of technical specifications or vertical 
integration combined with a lack of competition in the distribution system, which 
keep the market segmented even in the absence of tariffs and border controls.  
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4.2 Empirical Studies from the EU Auto Market 
Over the past decades, important steps have been taken in the European Union (EU) 
to integrate markets. One of the expected effects of the process of market integration 
in Europe is price convergence. This hope relies on the argument that the elimination 
of administrative and technical barriers to trade, as a result of the Single Market 
Project, and the recent adoption of the Euro reduce the potential for price 
discrimination across member states by bolstering cross-border trade and price 
transparency. However, the European car market has been a notorious example of 
deviations from the LOOP in international or intraregional markets. Large differences 
in car prices across countries were continually to be a persistent phenomenon in the 
Europe market.   
 
Mertens and Ginsburgh(1985) are the first as I know who proposed to estimate 
hedonic price regressions for about 100 car models sold in five European countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK) to study the European market. This 
method allows them to estimate specification-adjusted price indices based on price 
and characteristics such as length, width, engine, horsepower maximum speed and so 
on. They also included country-of origin fixed effects and domestic firm effects. They 
concluded that the degree of market concentration could explain the observe price 
differences. 
 
Ginsburgh and Vanhamme (1989) extended the hedonic analysis to consider a longer 
time period. They collected price and specifications data for about 120 models in the 
same five countries for the period 1984-1987. They found that specification-adjusted 
price differences had seriously decreased in 1986-1987 compared with 1983-1984.  
 
Mertens (1990) considered a bit more than 100 models within an even longer time 
period (1970-1985). Using hedonic regressions, he decomposed the evolution of price 
differences into an exchange rate effect and a residual effect. He found the price 
                                                          
 38 
differences and exchange rate movements seemed to move in a parallel direction for 
1980-1985. 
 
Gaul (1993) used data on list prices and transactions prices for 28models sold in 1986 
in 8 European countries. He found taxes (VAT) were an important determinant of 
price differences. In addition, domestic market power and the presence of import 
restrictions were significant explanatory variables. In contrast, transportation costs did 
not seem to be significant explanatory variable for price differences across countries. 
The similar results were also concluded by Flam and Nordstrom (1995) by using a 
data set of 11 countries during 1989-1992. 
 
Le Cacheux and Reichlin (1992) made the first attempts to quantify the degree of 
exchange rate pass- through by using monthly data form 1982-1987 for Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Their econometric analysis indicated that the 
cross-country price differences fluctuated almost proportional to the exchange rate 
fluctuations.  
 
Flam and Nordstrom (1995) considered the role of taxes, tariffs, and import quota 
constraints by using a data covering the prices of 43 models for 11 European countries 
sold during 1989-1992. They found that taxes significantly reduced the pre-tax price 
of cars, and the effects of tariffs on pre-tax prices were highly significant. 
Furthermore, they found the significant effects on price when the country adopted 
import quota constraints or if the car was domestically produced. 
 
Gross and Schmitt (1996) considered exchange rate pass-through by German, 
Japanese, French and Belgium-based automobile producers in the Swiss market, using 
quarterly data on import unit values for the period 1977-1991.they found that long-run 
pass-through rates that were typically less than 50%, and frequently in the 20-30% 
range.  
 
                                                          
 39 
Verboven (1996) estimated a structural model of price-setting behavior by using a 
data set on list prices, technical characteristics and sales for all models sold in 1990. 
The approach allowed him to explicitly distinguish between the roles of differences in 
profit markups and differences in local costs. He found that, differences in profit 
markups across countries could be interpreted as evidence of international price 
discriminations.  
 
Goldberg and Verboven (1998) computed hedonic price indices for the same five 
countries as Mertens and Ginsburgh (1985), covering about 100 models over the 
period 1980-1993. They found the volatility of the price differentials could be related 
to exchange rate fluctuations. They also found that price difference was contributed to 
cost and discount differences in the U.K., to domestic brand bias in Italy. 
 
Bouckaerk and Verboven (2000) extended to panel approach by Pareja and founded 
that exchange rate pass –through was greater in the long run than in the short run and 
the large international price differences could fluctuate considerably and persist over 
rather long period. 
 
Pareja (2003) investigated the price to market behavior in European car markets by 
using a data set including about 80 models over the period 1993-1998. He found 
evidence that there was strong pricing to market behavior or local currency price 
stability. 
 
Goldberg and Verboven (2003) used approximately 150 models per year in five 
European countries over the period 1970-2000. Their findings provide strong 
evidence in favor of the relative version of the LOOP. They found the country/product 
fixed effects capturing long-term persistent price differentials across markets to be 
jointly significant. 
 
Lutz (2004) also got the similar results as Goldberg and Verboven (2003) by examing 
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24 different brands and 88 models sold in twelve European countries for from 
1993-1998. His finding supports the relative version of the law of one price. He also 
concluded that the determinants of arbitrage costs had more explanatory power. The 
single most important factor was the distance between markets. Moreover, the regime 
of single currency lowered price differences significantly.  
 
4.3 Literature on Chinese Spatial Economy 
Local protectionism and impediments to the economic unification of the national 
market remain topical issues.  
 
Some early literature concluded that the local government tried to retain low priced 
raw materials within their own locality in order to favor local manufacturers, parallel 
with these struggles over low-priced raw materials were efforts to prevent inflows of 
manufacturing goods with high make-ups. Most of them were stories of semi-official 
tolls and police and customs checks. However, these descriptive accounts relied on 
anecdotes, and many were tied to specific circumstances, including price controls that 
have generally been abandoned in the 1990s.6 
 
Much of the current literature portrays china as a group of insufficiently specialized 
regional economies, meaning that national economic integration is low. In addition, 
China’s geographic expanse and rugged topography also means that there are 
significant physical barriers to inter-regional trade. Under such condition, many 
researchers argued that the Chinese economy looked like an aggregation of “fiefdom 
economies.”  
 
Regional protectionism by provincial or local authorities often blocks efficient 
distribution of goods and services inside China. These practices may restrict market 
                                                        
6During the mid-1980s, various examples such as “wool war” and the “silk war” were cited, in which local 
government tried to retain low priced raw materials within their own locality in order to favor local manufacturers 
(Waston, Finalay etal.(1989) Wedeman (1995)). 
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access for certain goods, raise production costs, and restrict market opportunities for 
enterprises in other regions. Kumar’s (1994) World Bank report “Internal Market 
Development and Regulation” underlines the limited degree of regional specialization 
and the weak mobility of factors and goods in China.7 One of the most evident 
perspectives is that regional price differentials for disaggregate commodities are 
prevalent. 
 
Mody and Wang (1997) used of data on the output of 23 industrial sectors in seven 
costal regions over the period of 1985 to 1989 to study the correlates of growth. They 
found that although industrial-specific features had some influence on growth, much 
of the action came from region-specific influences and regional spillovers.  
 
By carefully examining the input-output tables among Chinese provinces in 1987 and 
1992, Naughton (1999) concluded on the basis of finding significant inter-and 
intra-industry cross-provincial trade that Chinese provinces were reasonably 
integrated.  
 
Relying on indirect analyses of price and provincial economic structures data, Young 
(2000) showed evidence on the rise of local protectionism in China during the reform 
era and concluded that China had evolved into “a fragmented internal market with 
fiefdoms controlled by local officials” after 20 years of economic reform. 
  
Gong et al. (2003) reported that even though regional governments engaged in the 
protectionism of goods markets, the trend towards protectionism was declining. They 
stated that it increased the inward orientation of provinces and caused serious losses to 
firms. 
 
Poncet (2003) examined the inter-provincial trade flow data from provincial 
input-output tables for 1987, 1992 and 1997 to compare the magnitude and evolution 
                                                        
7
 See World Bank 1994 for a survey on constraints on domestic trade (p.38) 
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of Chinese provinces’ engagement in domestic and international trade at the aggregate 
level. She found that provincial borders mattered more and more inside China in the 
sense that they implied greater discontinuities in the Chinese domestic market. 
 
Bai et al.(2004) used a dynamic panel estimation method to examine a panel data set 
of 32 industries in nearly all the provinces over the period 1985-1997. They found that, 
while the effect of local protectionism on regional specialization was still evident in 
China, market forces had become more important, and had overcome the influence of 
local protectionism.  
 
Fan and Wei (2005) used a panel of monthly prices for 93 products and services from 
March 1990 to September 2003. They used the dataset at individual product level to 
understand local protectionism in China. They obtained opposite results when 
working at the individual goods level as most of the goods in their sample displayed a 
clear trend of convergence in prices over the 1990s, with the convergence rate 
increasing over time. 
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Chapter 5 Data and Description 
5.1 Data of Study 
The primary dataset used in this study is a panel of monthly pre-tax retail prices of the 
most popular models of car sold among 36 cities over the period 1994-2003 and 
2004-2006. The sample is drawn from the larger sample of consumer prices collected 
at the monthly frequency for the computation of the consumer price index for 
transportation sector by the Bureau of Statistics, which provides explicit instructions 
and data forms to data collectors. The reason that the dataset broken into two 
sub-periods is that the survey of the statistics in 2004 was suspended due to the 
restructuring of departments under the State Council. The first period sample consists 
of monthly series of retail prices of 21 most popular models collected in 36 cities of 
China over the period from January 1994 to March 2003. The second one covers 28 
models sold in the same 36 cities form January 2004 to December 2006. Altogether, 
the dataset includes a total of 49 models.  
 
The data set is unique in several ways. First, the data are three dimensional. The 
dimensions are time, model, and market. Second, it consists of pre-tax retail prices 
rather than post-tax prices. Because tax and levies are charged in the city where the 
car is registered rather than where it is purchased. So from the point of view of a 
potential buyer, pre-tax prices would have more influence on their purchase decision. 
Third, the sample covers 36 major Chinese cities, including all the capital cities of all 
provinces together with four municipalities, and several other important cities, like 
Shenzhen, Daling, Ningbo and Xiamen etc. Table 1 gives a complete list of cities. In 
essence, the data provide considerable geographic coverage for actual retail prices of 
over a set of comparable car models.  
 
[Insert Table 5.1 about here] 
All the price data are spot prices regularly collected by the local government agencies 
monthly. The dataset contained a few missing values, especially for earlier periods 
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and some remote cities. For the purpose of our analysis, we have had to use 
continuous time series data for each model and city. When the price in the months 
proceeding and following a month with a missing value remained constant, the 
constant price was imputed to the month having the missing value. If the proceeding 
and following months were different, I would fill the missing value by the average 
price of the month before and after the missing value. We therefore could choose the 
longest possible continuous time series for each product and city. To avoid the 
small-sample problem, we first excluded any model for which there were fewer than 
24 continuous observations in all cities. Next, we exclude those cities for which there 
were fewer than 24 continuous observations for each model. The result was 
unbalanced panel data set for a total of 44 models. Table 5.2 lists the car models 
together with the category to which they belong and their longest selling period 
available in the current sample.    
 
[Insert Table 5.2 about here] 
5.2 Basic Statistics 
In this section I carry out a preliminary analysis of the degree of deviation from the 
LOOP. The data set allows me to abstract from the effects of nominal exchange rates, 
trade policies and similar issues arising in an international context. To measure the 
speed of price convergence across cities of China, first the model specific price 
differential between two cities is computed first. This requires the choice of a 
benchmark city for each panel. Given Beijing’s central economic and political 
importance in China, Beijing is used as a benchmark city in much of the analysis.  
Moreover, the price data for Beijing are relatively the most complete ones when 
compared with other cities. Relative price or price variation is constructed as 
following: 
, , , , , ,
ln( )i k t i k t i Beijing tp P P=                   (5.1) 
Where 
, ,i k tP  is the price of model i at time t  in city k . Correspondingly, 
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, ,i Beijing tP  is the price of model i at time t  in Beijing ( k Beijing≠ ). Thus , ,i k tp  
measures the percentage difference between the prices of model i  in cities k  and 
Beijing at time t . In the absence of barriers to price equalization, the price 
differential measure 
, ,i k tp  would be zero. Otherwise, , ,i k tp  provides a measure of 
the size of the deviation from absolute price parity.  
 
Before discussing the regression results, it is useful to look at some summary statistics 
on the variability of price differentials and on the mean absolute price differentials 
which are presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively. The variability of price 
differentials is defined as the standard deviation over time of the price variations 
(
, , , , , ,
ln( )i k t i k t i Beijing tp P P= ). The mean absolute price differential is defined as the 
mean absolute deviation of the price variations. That is the mean over time
, ,
| |i k tp .  
[Insert Table 5.3 about here] 
[Insert Table 5.4 about here] 
 
As a first look at the data in table 5.3, the variability of price differentials averages at 
0.002 for all models and range from about 0.278 for NorthernStar 0.8 to -0.262 for 
GreatWall Safe 4WD. Another useful summary measure is the mean absolute price 
differentials. The variability was measured as the standard deviation of the relative 
price over time. This measure of variability averages 0.09 for all 20 models. Doesn’t 
like the mean of variability of price differentials, it shows smaller variation across 
models. Most of the models show standard deviation around 0.1.  
 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the mean absolute price differentials for 
all the models in my study. The mean absolute price differentials average 0.076 for all 
models and range from 0.285 for NorthernStar 0.8 to 0.027 for Accord 2.4I-VTEC. 
The lower bound for the individual price differentials is zero but the data reveal some 
substantial price differences, with a few low-price models exceeding 0.4. The standard 
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deviations for the mean absolute price differentials average 0.075, slightly lower than 
that for the variability of price differentials.  
 
From table 5.3 and 5.4, we can see that there exist significant differences of price 
differentials among models regardless whether the variability of price differentials or 
the mean absolute price differentials is used. 
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Chapter 6 Results on Convergence 
The LOOP implies that profit incentives and market forces induce the prices for the 
same product sold in different markets to tend to converge to the same level. This 
implies that the time series of relative prices are mean reverting, or stationary. To test 
for stationarity, it is a common practice to apply unit root tests, where rejection of the 
unit root hypothesis implies that the time series of relative prices are stationary, and 
will in the long-run converge. If the test fails to reject the unit root hypothesis, relative 
prices follow a random walk and any deviation in prices becomes derangement.  
 
The fundamental objective of this study is to characterize the degree of persistence in 
intra-city price differentials. Though the data exhibit sizeable deviations from absolute 
price parity in the short run (see Table 5.3 and Table 5.4), it doesn’t mean there is not 
a long-run tendency towards parity. Rejection of the unit root hypothesis implies that 
relative prices are stationary and converge to a long-run value. This can be interpreted 
as consistent with long-run relative parity when convergence is to a non-zero constant 
or long-run absolute parity when convergence is to zero. The reason for long run 
relative parity is evident: persistent income differences and local non-tradable factors 
of production, transportation costs, selling expense and other potentially 
time-invariant barriers of trade may create a constant price gap among retail prices at 
different cities. The price differentials may never fully converge to zero but just 
approach to a common, potentially non-zero level, being identical across different 
cities.  
 
We will begin with a series of individual tests for unit roots in all the price series 
measuring the price in each city relative to Beijing.  
 
6.1 Univariate ADF Test 
The most common tool for testing whether a data series is non-stationary is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Univariate Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
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were performed to each individual time series to examine whether the relative price 
series are stationary based on a unit root null and an alternative of mean-stationarity. 
The test regresses the first difference of a variable on a constant, its lagged level and 
Z  lagged first differences using the following equation:  
 
, , , , , , 1 , , , , , ,
1
Z
i k t i k i k i k t i k t i k t z i k t
z
p c p pα β ε
− −
=
∆ = + + ∆ +∑                      (6.1) 
 
where the term 
, ,i k tp  is the price differential measure 
(
, , , , , ,
ln( )i k t i k t i Beijing tp P P= (5.1)), ∆ is a first difference operator 
(
, , , , , , 1i k t i k t i k tp p p −∆ = − ) and ε  is an error term; i , k  and t  represent model, city 
and month, respectively. Z  is the optimal number of lags. The constant is included 
to capture city-specific characteristics, like taxes, market structure, the price elasticity 
of demand and specific geographies. The parameter of primary interest in the 
empirical specification is 0β , capturing the degree of persistence in price differentials. 
The unit root test is a one-tailed t-test on the parameter 
,
0i kα =  against , 0i kα < . 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) considered tests with 0z =  (DF-test), whereas Said and 
Dickey (1984) “augmented” the Dickey and Fuller (1999) regression to allow for 
serial correlated errors in the process under investigation (The ADF test). The ADF 
test in (1) is thus appropriate for alternatives in the linear ARMA-class of processes. 
The researcher must pick a sensible value of Z  to adjust for additional serial 
dependence. Usually an information criterion is used to select Z . The ADF test is 
given by the t-statistics ¶ ¶
, ,
/ . .( )i k i kADF s dα α= , where ¶,i kα  is estimated by OLS 
and ¶
,
. .( )i ks d α  is estimated deviation of ¶,i kα . Asymptotic critical values can be 
found in Fuller (1976). Ng and Perron (2001) proposed a new class of modified 
information criteria (MIC) for selecting the appropriate number of lags in the 
auto-regression, and within this class they suggested a modified version of the Akaike 
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information criterion (MAIC). They argued that MAIC had better theoretical and 
empirical properties than other criteria. The optimal lag structure which capturing the 
possible serial correlation is determined for each series individually using Modified 
Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC). 
 
[Insert Table 6.1 about here] 
[Insert Table 6.2 about here] 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 report the results for single time series ADF Tests by model 
and city respectively. Specifically, we list the proportion of cities for each car model 
where the null hypothesis can be rejected at 5% significance levels in column 3, 10% 
significance levels in column 4. As can be seen from column 3, at 5% significance 
level, the proportion ranges from the lowest of 1 out of 29 cities (BuickCentury 3.0) to 
the highest of 20 out of 29 cities (Jetta 1.6GiX). Using 10% significance level, the 
proportion changes to from the lowers of 1 out 29 cities ((BuickCentury 3.0) to the 
highest of 20 out of 29 cities (Jetta 1.6GiX and RedFlag CenturyStar2.0E). On a more 
aggregate level, 266 out of 1305 city time series (20.38%) can reject the unit root 
hypothesis at 5% level, while 378 out of 1305 city time series (28.97%) can reject the 
unit root hypothesis at 10 % level. Thus, the results revel a little bit evidence for auto 
market convergence. This is not surprising, however, given the unit root test’s low 
power against a highly persistent alternative.  
 
6.2 Panel Unit Root Test 
It is now generally known that the traditional unit root tests such as Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics lack power in distinguishing the 
unit root null form stationary alternatives, especially with short time span. They tend 
not to reject the unit root null even if it is false. Researchers have tried to exploit the 
panel dimension of the data as one way of increasing the power of unit root tests. The 
other way is to turn to a panel test procedure to examine the null of unit root in our 
panel of price series. In recent years, to overcome the problem of low power of the 
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univariate ADF test, a number of methodological developments by Levin and Lin 
(1993), Im, Pesaran, and Shin(1997), Maddala and Wu (1999), have provided 
foundations for the application of panel tests to a wide variety of economic and 
financial variables. The main advantage of the panel test procedure over the standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is that it exploits the extra information provided by the 
pooled cross sectional time series and dramatically increases the power of the tests. 
Therefore this analysis follows recent studies in using panel methods to test for unit 
roots in the relative price series.  
 
The three tests mentioned previously are all based on the well-known ADF test for 
univariate time series. They differ in the assumptions made about the heterogeneity of 
the regression parameters for the observed unites and in the derived test statistics.   
 
The test developed by Levin and Lin (1993) provided the statistical foundation for 
panel unit root tests, which is applied to the panel data set, assuming an identical 
regression parameter  Under the LL test, the null and alternative hypothesis for 
model i  is given by  
 
0 ,1 ,2 ,: ... 0i i i k iH α α α α= = = = = and 1 ,1 ,2 ,: ... 0i i i k iH α α α α= = = = <  
 
Their specification, provided for lagged differences to correct for serial correlation of 
the error terms. However, they don’t address the problem of contemporaneous cross 
correlation of the errors and restricted all panel members to have identical orders of 
integration. This limitation becomes all the more important in panels with mixed 
orders of integration. Although the null hypothesis that all series have a unit root is 
correctly rejected, the alternative of ‘all stationary’ is also false in these mixed panels. 
Consequently, rejection of the null hypothesis with LL test may have lead to over 
support of law of one price or purchasing power parity.   
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Recognizing this problem, Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), Maddala and Wu (1997, 
1999) present second generation panel unit root tests that allow the auto regressive 
coefficient to differ across the panel under the alternative hypothesis. IPS-Test applies 
the ADF test separately to the individual time series, which allows different 
autoregressive coefficient as well as heterogeneity of lag structures in the K individual 
series. While the null hypothesis for model i assumes the same as LL-Test, which can 
be represented as 0 ,1 ,2 ,: ... 0i i i k iH α α α α= = = = = , the alternative hypothesis 
states that at least one unit shows asymptotic stationarity by 1 ,: 0i kH α < , for some 
k . This test is constructed as a simple average of the t-statistics on the 
,i kα ’s 
generated from N single-equation augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Specifically, to 
compute the statistic, one first needs to estimates the argument DF regression given in 
equation (1) above individually for each of the 1,2,...,36k =  cities of each model 
i  and then constructs the 36 corresponding ADF t-statistics, 
,i kt . These individual 
statistics are averaged to obtain the t-bar statistic
,
1
1 K
i i k
k
t t
K
=
= ∑ . Since the distribution 
of the individual ADF t-statistics is not centered around zero under the unit root null 
hypothesis, it becomes necessary to adjust for this feature to ensure that the 
distribution of the t-bar does not diverge under the null hypothesis as the number of 
cities grows large. Fortunately, under the null hypothesis, the mean of the individual 
,i kt  is a known constant as the sample size T grows large, as is the standard deviation 
of the individual 
,i kt .Finally, the t-bar statistic is adjusted by subtracting off the mean 
and dividing by the standard deviation, so that the statistic becomes 
 
( ) / (0,1)i i i iz K t u s N= − →                                           (6.2) 
 
where iu is the known mean of the individual ADF t-statistic distribution for model 
i , and s  is the known standard deviation of the individual ADF t-statistic 
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distribution for model i , both of them are from Monte Carlo simulations. The power 
to reject the null increases with K . 
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) use the single-equation OLS estimation similar to the IPS test 
except that the p-values corresponding to the individual t-statistics for a unit root in 
each cross-sectional unit are used to construct the Fisher test statistic, a Chi-Square 
test statistic. The Maddala-Wu test assumes the resulting statistics from the N 
individually applied Augmented Dickey-fuller tests to be distributed independently. 
Again, the null hypothesis for model i  assumes that all units exhibit a unit root, 
which can be represented as 0 ,1 ,2 ,: ... 0i i i k iH α α α α= = = = = , and the alternative 
hypothesis states that at least one unit shows asymptotic stationarity, 1 ,: 0i kH α < , 
for some k . Specifically, for each city k  the results of the univariate unit root tests 
for model i  were combined to perform Fisher’s pλ  test. The overall test statistic is  
 
,
1
2 log( )
K
i k
k
p pλ
=
= − ∑                                               (6.3) 
 
where K is the number of cities included for model i  ,
,i kp  is the marginal 
significance level associated with the individual member test statistics, for example, 
time series of model i  in city k . Maddala and Wu have shown that since the 
marginal significance levels for the individual tests are uniformly distributed between 
0 and 1, 
,
2log( )i kp−  is distributed as a 2χ  with two degree of freedom. For the K 
number of the panel, under the assumption that the individual statistics are 
independent, pλ  has a 
2χ  distribution with a degree of freedom 2K, based on a 
theorem developed by R.A. Fisher (1932). The advantage of Fisher’s ( pλ ) Test is that 
it is applicable to both unbalanced and balanced panel data sets and allows the 
autocorrelation coefficients to differ across panel members, which means one can use 
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different lag lengths in the individual Augmented DF regressions. Another advantage 
of the Maddala-Wu test is that it is an exact test, while the IPS test is an asymptotic 
test. From this point, it convinces me that the Fisher’s Test is more powerful than IPS 
test in my study. 
 
Table 6.3 displays the results for Maddala and Wu’s Fisher type panel unit root tests in 
column 3. The table shows than we can reject the null of a unit root for the majority 
but 6 car models at 10% level of significance: There is strong tendency for car prices 
to converge to LOOP.  
 
[Insert Table 6.3 about here] 
Like the IPS test, the Maddala-Wu test is also constructed under the assumption that 
that the individual tests are independent of one another across cities. But in practice, it 
is highly possible that these price differentials are contemporaneously correlated. In 
this case, the Maddala-Wu tests are not strictly valid. As Maddala and Wu (1999) 
point out the individual 
,i kp can be used to construct a test based on the 
Dufour-Torres (1998) criteria which does not depend on the independence of the 
individual test statistics and is thus affected by the presence of cross-correlation. This 
testing method generally has lower power than the Maddala-Wu test, making it a more 
conservative test of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The Dufour-Torres test 
involves segmenting the null hypothesis:   0 ,1 ,2 ,: ... 0i i i k iH α α α α= = = = =  
into K sub-hypothesis of the form: 0 ,: 0k i kH a = . The null hypothesis can by rejected 
if any of the sub-hypothesis kH0  is rejected. The Bonferroni inequality constraint 
indicates that the marginal significance level P  for a rejection of the null hypothesis 
0H  applied to the panel of K members is given by ,
1
K
i k
k
P p
=
≤∑  , where ,i kp is the 
marginal significance level of the kth sub-hypothesis. Dufour and Torres recommend 
using the criteria that /DTP P K= , to determine the rejection area. In this paper, the 
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Dufour and Torres criteria DTP  are different among models since the panel of each 
model includes different number of series. For an overall significance level of 
10%P = , at least one 
,i kp  must be less than 10% / K .8 Based on the p-values 
from univariate Augmented DF tests, those criteria are met for 31 of 44 models (Table 
6.2). Among the exceptions are 6 models for which the Maddala-Wu test could not 
reject the null. For the others-Xiali1.3, Fukang1.4AL, Fukang988, 
RedFlagLuckstar1.8AE, Bora1.8T, Santana1.8GLi, Minyi1.0H, and Landcruiser4500 
4.5AT-the hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected in the Maddala-Wu test but cannot 
be rejected in the Dufour-Torres test. The results of Dufour-Torres test indicate that, 
with the exception of the later models, the presence of cross correlation is not 
sufficient to reverse the findings of mean-stationarity based on the Maddala-Wu test. 
 
While unit root tests can provide evidence on whether or not shocks to individual 
cities are transitory they are silent on how long the effects of these shocks will persist. 
One of the most common methods of measuring persistence is to calculate the 
half-life of price deviations, i.e. the amount of time it takes a shock to a series to 
revert half-way back to its mean value. The approximate half-life of a shock to 
,i kP  
is computed as 
,
| ln(0.5) / ln(1 ) |i kh α= + , Our primary focus is on the ,i kα , the 
coefficients on the lagged logarithm of the price, 
, ,i k tp . The nearer ,i kα  is to zero, 
the longer is the estimated half-life of a shock. The average half lives for all 
convergent price series of each model are presented in Table 6.2 too. The speed of 
convergence gives us some insights about the process of market integration of auto 
market in China. A fast speed of convergence is an indication of well-functioning 
markets with rather strong competition. According to the results showing in Table 6.3, 
the average half life ranges from 0.389 month for Hiace2.2ME to 2.669 months for 
Santana2000GSi, with the overall average half life 1.383 months and the median 
                                                        
8
 For 5% significance level, the way is similar. In the paper, I only report the results at 10% significance level for 
Dufour-Torres test. 
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1.246 months.  
 
6.3 Nonlinear Unit Root Test 
A common problem with the tests proposed by Im et al.(1997) and Maddala and Wu 
(1997) stems from the joint hypothesis that is tested. Under the joint hypothesis, 
rejection does not provide information about how many panel members reject the null 
hypothesis and how many do not. Consequently, the rejection of null hypothesis can 
be produced with as few as one stationary member of the panel, and therefore that it 
would be inappropriate to infer that all members of the panel are stationary. Another 
problem is that the standard linear unit root test is not expected to be very powerful 
when the true process is stationary but non-linear. Kapetanios, Shin and Snell 
(hereafter, KSS) (2003) developed a new technique for the null hypothesis of a unit 
root against an alternative of nonlinear stationary smooth transition autoregressive 
(STAR) process. They argued that, under the assumption that the price differences 
follow nonlinear stationary processes, the alternative hypothesis of linear stationarity 
in the standard ADF tests would be misspecified. Using quarterly bilateral real 
exchange rates with the US dollar and real interest rates for the 1957-198 and 
1957-2000 period, respectively, for some selected OECD countries, KSS (2003) have 
illustrated that their tests are more powerful than the standard ADF tests. Chortareas 
and Kapetanios(2004), Hasan(2004) and Liew, Baharumshah, and Chong(2004) have 
applied the KSS tests to the bilateral real exchange rates of Japan, India, and a group 
of Asian countries, respectively. More recently, Chortareas and Kapetanios (2006) 
apply the KSS tests to the yen real exchange rates against the other G7 and Asian 
currencies during the post-Bretton Woods era, and found more support for PPP than 
the linear ADF tests.  
 
Here I give an account of the non-linear stationary test procedures developed by 
Kapetanios et al (2003) to incorporate non-linearity in time series movement in testing 
for stationarity of price difference. KSS has expanded the standard ADF test by 
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keeping the null hypothesis as nonstationarity in a time series variable against the 
alternative of a nonlinear but globally stationary process. Consider a univariate 
smooth transition autoregressive of order 1 (STAR (1)) model, 
 
*
, , , , 1 , , 1 , , , ,( ) , 1,..., ; 1i k t i k t i k t i k t d i k tp p p F p t T dβ β ε− − −= + +   =  ≥             (6.4) 
 
Where 
, ,i k tp  is the de-meaned or de-trended data, tε  is an i.i.d. error with zero 
mean and constant variance, *,β β  are unknown parameters and 
, ,
( )i k t dF p −  is the 
exponential transition function adopted in the test to present the nonlinear adjustment 
which by convention is bounded by zero and one.  
 
Following the literature on the STAR  models, the popular exponential transition 
function is applied. 
 
2
, , , ,
( ) 1 exp( )i k t d i k t dF p pθ− −= − −                                          (6.5) 
 
where I assume that 0θ ≥ , and the delay parameter 1d ≥  is given. 
 
Using (6.5) in (6.4) gives an exponential ( )STAR ESTAR  model  
 
* 2
, , , , 1 , , 1 , , , ,[1 exp( )]i k t i k t i k t i k t d i k tp p p pβ β θ ε− − −= + − − +                    (6.6) 
 
which can be reparameterised as  
 
* 2
, , , , 1 , , 1 , , , ,( 1) [1 exp( )]i k t i k t i k t i k t d i k tp p p pβ β θ ε− − −∆ = − + − − +              (6.7) 
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root is considered, which in terms of the above model 
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implies that 1β =  and 0θ = (and thus 2
, ,
[1 exp( )] 0i k t dpθ −− − = ). Under the null, 
then (6.7) becomes the non-stationary linear model: 
 
, , , ,i k t i k tp ε∆ =                                                                (6.8)   
 
Under the alternative of stationarity ( 1β =  and 0θ > ), θ  is strictly positive and   
(6.7) becomes 
 
* 2
, , , , 1 , , , ,[1 exp( )]i k t i k t i k t d i k tp p pβ θ ε− −∆ = − − +                              (6.9) 
 
We set 1β =  both under the null and under the alternative hypothesis. In this 
specification, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity with the KSS test procedure is 
0 : 0H θ =  against the mean-reverting nonlinear alternative hypothesis 1 : 0H θ > . 
Obviously because *β  in (6.9) is not identified under the null, we cannot directly 
test 0 : 0H θ = . To deal with the issue, KSS suggests to reparameterize (6.9) by 
computing a first-order Taylor series approximation to specification (6.9) to obtain the 
auxiliary regression expressed by (6.10) below: 
 
3
, , , , 1 , ,i k t i k t i k tp pδ ε−∆ = +                                             (6.10) 
 
A relevant issue that emerges is the possibility of serial correlation in the error term. 
The presence of serial correlation may be dealt with by an augmentation similar to 
that undertaken for the Dickey-Fuller tests. In particular, lagged differences of the 
dependent variable may be included in the regression. For a more general case where 
the errors in (6.10) are serially correlated, regression (6.10) is extended to  
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3
, , , , , , 1 , ,
1
p
i k t j i k t j i k t i k t
j
p p pρ δ ε
− −
=
∆ = ∆ + +∑                                   (6.11) 
 
With the p  augmentations, which are used to correct for serially correlated errors. 
The null hypothesis of nonstationarity to be tested is 0 : 0H δ =  against the 
alternative 0 : 0H δ <  with either 6.10 or 6.11 based on t-type statistic of δ , in 
which the asymptotical distribution is non-normal and thus decision cannot be based 
on the conventionally tabulated t table. They tabulated the asymptotic critical values 
of the statistics via stochastic simulations and presented the table in their paper. 
 
Following the suggestions of Kapetanios et al (2003), the number of augmentations p 
for either the ADF tests or the KSS tests is selected using the Modified Akaike 
Information Criterion by Ng and Perron (1995), which are the same as doing ADF test 
previously.  
 
[Insert Table 6.1 about here] 
[Insert Table 6.2 about here] 
We report the test results for the non-linear KSS Test in Table 6.1 and 6.2 too. The 
KSS Test statistics based on regression 6.10 are denoted by KSS1, while the test 
results based on regression 6.11 are denoted by KSS2. To accommodate stochastic 
processes with non-zero means and/or linear deterministic trends, we first obtain the 
demeaned and demeaned as well as de-trended price data before subject the time 
series to the KSS1 or KSS2 test. For each car model, we list the proportion of cities 
for all four test statistics where the null hypothesis can be rejected at ten percent 
significance levels in column 5 to column 8 of Table 6.1. As can be seen from the 
table, the performance of four type KSS tests is fundamentally different from the 
linear ADF Test done before. 
 
For example, using 10% significance level, the proportion has been improved from 
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the 1 out 29 cities by applying ADF Test to 3 out of 29 cities by applying all four 
kinds of KSS Test for BuickCentury3.0. For Passat2.0L, the performance has changed 
from 13 out of 35 cities for ADF Test to 30 out 35 cities for KSS1 test with demeaned 
price series. On a more aggregate level, at 10% level of significance, 468 out of 1305 
car price series (35.86%) can reject the unit root hypothesis by applying demeaned 
KSS1 test, 474 out of 1305 car price series (36.32%) can reject the unit root 
hypothesis by applying de-meaned KSS2 Test, 506 out 1305 time series (38.77%) can 
reject unit root by applying de-trended KSS1 Test, while 508 out of 1305 time series 
(38.93%) can reject the unit root hypothesis for KSS2 Test after de-trend the price 
data. If we look at the individual models, we can find that there are about 16 models 
which the proportion of the null hypothesis can be rejected at 10% significance levels 
are larger than 50%. Thus, the results indicate that nonlinear KSS Test support long 
run convergence more often than the standard linear ADF Test. KSS Test provides 
more substantial evidence to support long run price parity in Chinese auto market.  
 
As I mentioned before, Maddala-Wu test is an exact and non-parametric test, and may 
be computed for any arbitrary choice of a test for the unit root in a cross-section unit. 
We may want to construct the MW test statistic by using KSS type nonlinear 
procedure for each city. However, the KSS test does not provide a similar p-value of 
the test statistic in city k  for model i .  
    
6.4 The Determinants of Price Dispersion 
My measure of integration of two locations-the dependent variable in my 
regressions-is the yearly standard deviation of the log price difference of model i  
between city k and Beijing, 
, ,
. .( )i k tStd Dev p . As mentioned before, all the car 
prices are collected on month frequency. I exclude Lhasa from my analysis due to the 
incompleteness of other data.       
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When consider changes in prices, the dependent variable is
, ,
| |i k tp , which means the 
absolute value of average price difference at year t. This data then runs from 
1995-2002 and 2004-2006, for a time dimension of 15 years. This panel has 3852 
observations.  
 
The first explanatory variable in the regression is the log railway distance from city k 
to Beijing. Distance can serve as the proxy of transportation cost and is the most 
frequently motioned barriers to goods arbitrage in testing for LOOP. Engel (1993), 
Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (1996) explain how the distance 
between cities might help to explain deviations from the law of one price.  
 
The second explanatory variable is the yearly absolute value difference in the log of 
the per capital annual income between city between city k  and Beijing9. It is 
conceivable that markets are integrated to the extend that wholesale price from the 
producers are nearly equal but that differences in local income level drives a wedge 
between prices in different cities. The income difference can serve as both a measure 
of local purchasing power and a measure of local cost, such as wages.  
 
The third explanatory variable is the absolute value difference in the log of the 
population between city k  and Beijing, This variable is included because larger 
cities means lager markets and more fierce competition, then lager cities tend to have 
lower auto prices than smaller ones. The population variable is time varying in the 
regressions, with data in each year from 1995-2006.  
 
The fourth explanatory variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
manufacturer’s headquarters or the production of model i  is based in city k , zero 
other wise. Basically local protectionism is a series of practices that provincial and 
municipal governments use to limit the inflow of potentially competing products or 
                                                        
9
 The per capital income data for all 34 cities is from CEIC.   
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otherwise protect the interests of local companies. Local protectionism may take the 
forms of favorable financing, favorable regulations, assistance in restructuring and 
restrictions on outside participation. It is difficult for me to get all these variables or 
their proxies to measure the extent of local protectionism. This dummy variable is 
meant to partially capture the advantage of local production or the potential influence 
of local protectionism.  
 
The fifth variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if city k  locates in 
coastal provinces of China, and zero other wise. This variable is introduced to capture 
the difference of economic openness between in inner cities and coastal cities. We 
also include dummy variables for each model, iModel . This variable takes on the 
value of one if the price data is for model i . It is intend to capture any idiosyncratic 
aspects of a given model than tends to make it different. Finally we also performance 
regressions using a time trend variable. 
 
Thus, when we estimate equations for differences in price levels, our regression takes 
the form:  
 
, , 1 , 2 , , 3 , ,
42
4 , 4 5 , ,
1
. .( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i k t k Beijing k Beijing t k Beijing t
i t i i i k t
i
Std Dev p DISTANCE INCOME POPULATION
LOCAL COASTAL TREND MODEL
α α α
α α α β ε
=
= + +
                            + + + + +                       (6.12)∑
 
For changes in prices, the equation is similar: 
, , 1 , 2 , , 3 , ,
42
4 , 4 5 , ,
1
| | ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
(6.13)
i k t k Beijing k Beijing t k Beijing t
i t i i i k t
i
p DISTANCE INCOME POPULATION
LOCAL COASTAL TREND MODEL
α α α
α α α β ε
=
= + +
                            + + + + +          ∑
 
    
Table 6.4 reports regression results for equation (6.12). The COASTAL variable and 
POPULATION variable are proved not to be statistically significant in my regressions, 
so I report results only for those specifications that drop those variables. The 
remaining variables are highly significant, and the coefficients all have the expected 
sign. The coefficients on DISTANCE and INCOME have interpretations as elasticity. 
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A 10 percent increase in the distance between the two cities ceteris paribus increases 
the absolute price difference between the cities by 1.4 one-hundredths of one percent. 
Similarly, the effect of a 10 percent increase in relative income between two cities is 
to increase the absolute value of the price differential by 4.6 one-hundredths of one 
percent. The dummy variable LOCAL is not significant enough. Since the dependent 
variable is the standard deviation of price, it would also be difficult to interpret the 
variable as a measure of economic integration. 
 
[Insert Table 6.4 about here] 
The estimated coefficients for equation (6.13) when all items are included in the panel 
are reported in Table 6.5. While the INCOME variable is still statistically significant, 
distance no longer is. That is, changes in the absolute price differences are not 
significantly linked to distance, which contrasts with the finding of the first regression. 
The magnitude of the INCOME effect is larger than that in regression (1)-it accounts 
for a 0.79 percent difference in price change. The coefficient on the LOCAL gives us 
the absolute average difference in price if the car is locally produced, holding other 
explanatory effects constant. We see from Table 6.5 that the difference is 0.95 percent 
and it is statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 6.5 about here] 
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Chapter 7 Concluding Remarks 
7.1 Major Conclusions 
In the paper, I have examined the issue of convergences of 44 car models’ prices 
across 36 cities in China for the period 1994-2003 and 2004-2006. Based on panel 
unit root test for the period 1994-2003 and 2004-2006 respectively, I find evidence 
against a panel unit root for the majority of models sold in china and thus support for 
the law of one price for car market in China.  
 
With regard to the degree of persistence of deviations from LOOP after a shock, my 
empirical estimations show an average half-life less than 2 months for all car models 
passing the panel unit root tests, which is overwhelmingly shorter than the estimation 
by Wei and Fan (2005) for 93 products (including 4 car models) sold in China from 
1994 to 2003.  
 
I have also applied a new test developed by Kapetanios et al. (2003) which 
incorporates non-linearity in the mean reverting process of a time series variable. It 
also provides more support for LOOP in as compared to the standard linear ADF test.  
 
At the end of this study, after investigating possible explanatory factors in price 
disparities of auto markets among cities, I find that the geographic distance between 
markets, difference of per capital income, and the existence of local production all 
play important roles in the absolute price differentials as well as the standard 
deviation of price differentials among Chinese cities.   
 
Contradicting to the general expectation, my findings indicate that local protectionism 
hasn’t blocked the progress towards integration in China’s auto market in the last 
decade even though discriminative treatments against non-local products have been 
used by some provincial and city governments so as to favor their local car 
manufacturers. Market force has played a key role in the price mechanism and the 
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Central government has made certain achievements in actively eliminating regional 
market blocks and local protectionism.   
 
7.2 Recommendations  
As I mentioned before, choosing Beijing as the benchmark is because that the price 
data for Beijing are more complete and cover a longer period of time than those for 
other cities for nearly all car models sold in the first period (1994-2003). In future 
research, for the test of market integration section of the second period (2004-2006), 
we could first generate city pairs rather than only choose Beijing as the benchmark, 
which I believe could generate more convincing results regarding market integration. 
Therefore, it is likely to be a more complicated improvement or extension.  
 
Second, car models could be divided into different classes, such as mini, compact, 
middle size or luxury cars according to size, horse power and inside configurations. 
Car models in different classes generally will meet different customers and 
competitors. They may show different competition behaviors and pricing strategies. 
Thus, another extension is to categorize them into different classes, and then examine 
the price differentials as whole within each category. 
 
Finally, in this research, due the availability of data, we do not integrate other control 
variables into the models explaining the price differentials except income, distance 
and population. This could be a shortcoming since the price differentials could be 
caused by discrimination pricing from the producers, brand preference in different 
regions, the access ability of after selling service for different car models in the same 
city , or the difference of car registration system among regions.  
 
7.3 Policy Implications  
The panel unit root method analysis in this paper shows strong evidence that China’s 
auto market tends to be truly integrated with the implementation of a sequence of laws 
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and regulations aimed to remove interregional trade barriers and eliminate local 
protectionism. However, the results of univariate unit root tests, including the 
traditional ADF tests together the latest and more powerful KSS nonlinear tests, 
suggest that those policies or the auto market itself still have some imperfections. 
Thus, it is in the government’s interests to further enhance the magnitude of market 
mechanism. It needs to ensure that the domestic auto market is functioning smoothly, 
combating local protection and alleviating regional monopoly, so as to create an open 
market environment. 
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Appendix  
Table 3.1 Production of Cars by Manufacturers in 1992 and 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    1992  1993 
Producer Model Volume %  Volume % 
Shanghai-VW Santana 65000 32.2  100001 32.4 
Tianjin Automobile Xiali 30150 14.9  47850 15.5 
FAW Audi 100 15127 7.5  17807 5.8 
Guangzhou Peugeot Peugeot505 15410 7.6  16763 5.4 
Beijing Jeep XJ Cherokee 20001 9.9  13809 4.5 
FAW-VW A2 Jetta 8062 4  12117 3.9 
Changan Alto 5565 2.8  10463 3.4 
Dongfeng Citroen Citroen ZX 801 0.4  5062 1.6 
Others  41884 20.7  85128 27.5 
Total  202000 100  309000 100 
             
Source: China, International Motor Business; Third Quarter 1994, P192  
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Table 3.3 The Production of Main Auto Plants in China from 1994-2006
Producer Dominant Brand  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Shanghai VW Santana/ Passat 115,326 160,070 200,222 230,443 235,000 230,946 221,524 230,281 278,890 405,252 347,531 229,463 342,073 
FAW VW Jetta/Bora/Audi 8219 20,001 26,864 46,405 66,100 81,464 110,177 133,893 191,695 302,346 287,117 241,002 343,621 
Dongfeng Citroen Fukang /Citroen  — 1,314 9,158 30,035 36,240 40,200 53,900 53,680 84,378 105,475 88,034 141,661 201,858 
FAW Xiali Xiali 58,500 65,000 88,000 95,155 100,021 11,828 81,951 51,019 89,921 117,186 130,506 192,964 201,663 
Beijing Jeep Chrokee 14,703 25,127 26,051 19,377 8,344 9,294 4,867 4,653 9,052 19,441 33,764 26,493 n.a 
Shanghai GM Buick — — — — — 23,290 30,024 58,543 111,623 206,964 251,941 221,321 268,006 
Guangzhou Honda Accord/FIT — — — — 344 10,008 32,228 51,131 59,024 117,178 202,312 203,762 226,183 
FAW Hongqi/Audi 20,228 17,968 17,968 22,182 15,051 15,731 31,225 17,094 30,165 48,219 50,009 58,817 n.a 
Beijing Hyundai Hyundai — — — — — — — — 1,356 55,113 150,158 220,934 262,115 
Changan Suzuki Alto/ Swift 10,020 12,508 16,425 35,155 35,555 44,181 48,235 43,123 67,864 102,083 107,337 168,242 112,565 
Dongfeng Nissan Nissan — — — — — — — — 38,897 66,134 64,197 164,766 195,714 
Chery Chery — — — — — — —    2767 50,398 101,141 79,565 185,588 307,232 
Others  23,337 23,473 6,411 8,943 11,206 98,424 -9,454   57,337 88,433 421,679 432,034 723,758 1,408,464 
TOTAL  250,333 325,461 391,099 487,695 507,861 565,366 604,677 703,521 1,101,696 2,068,211 2,224,505 2,778,771 3,869,494 
  
1,353,368 1,452,697 1,474,905 1,582,628 1,629,182 1,834,349 2,077,371 2,340,209 3,262,947 4,443,744 5,079,356 5,744,958 7,279,726 
Number of plants producing >10,000 
 3 4 5 5 5 8 9 15 15 15 20 24 
Number of plants producing >50,000 
 2 2 2 3 3 4 7 6 7 4 2 4 
Number of plants producing >100,000 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 7 10 12 13 15 
Number of plants   122 122 122 119 119 118 118 116 117 115 117 117 117 
— Not available because plants have closed or were not yet opened 
n.a : Not applicable 
Sources:  Zhongguo qiche gongye nianjian (China Automotive Industry Yearbook)  (various issues) 
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TABLE 5.1 Descriptions of 36 Cities 
City Province Rank or Status City Province Rank or Status 
Eastern Area 
  
Central Area   
Beijing Beijing National capital and municipality  Taiyuan Shanxi Provincial capital  
Tianjin Tianjin Municipality Hefei Anhui Provincial capital  
Shi Jiazhuang Hebei Provincial capital  Nanchang Jiangxi Provincial capital  
Shanghai Shanghai Municipality Zhengzhou Henan Provincial capital  
Nanjing Jiangsu Provincial capital  Wuhan Hubei Provincial capital  
Hangzhou Zhejiang Provincial capital  Changsha Hunan Provincial capital  
Ningbo Zhejiang Second largest city of the province Werstrn Area   
Fuzhou Fujian Provincial capital  Hohehot Inner Mongolia Provincial capital  
Xiamen Fujian Second largest city of the province Nanning Guangxi Provincial capital  
Jinan Shandong Provincial capital  Chongqing Chongqing Provincial capital  
Qingdao Shandong Second largest city of the province Chengdu Sichuan Provincial capital  
Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial capital  Guiyang Guizhou Provincial capital  
Shenzhen Guangdong Second largest city of the province Kunming Yunnan Provincial capital  
Haikou Hainan Provincial capital  Lahsa Tibet Provincial capital  
Northeastern Area 
 
Sian Shaanxi Provincial capital  
Shenyang Liaoning Provincial capital  Lanzhou Gansu Provincial capital  
Dalian Liaoning Second largest city of the province Xining Qinghai Provincial capital  
Changcun Jilin Provincial capital  Yinchuan Ningxia Provincial capital  
Harbin Heilongjiang Provincial capital  Urumchi Xinjiang Provincial capital  
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Table 5.2 Model Description 
Model Name Classification Sample Period Manufacturer OEM Partner Location 
1994-2003 Models produced by domestic makers or joint ventures 
Xiali 1.0  Microcar 1994/04-2000/06 Tianjin Automobile Technology transfer from Daihatsu (TOYOTA) Tianjin 
Xiali 1.3 Microcar 1999/03-2003/03 Tianjin Automobile Technology transfer from Daihatsu (TOYOTA) Tianjin 
Citroën Fukang 1.6AL Sub Compact Car 1997/01-2000/05 Dongfeng Citroen CITROEN (PSA) Wuhan 
Citroën Fukang 998 1.6EL Compact Car 1999/03-2003/03 Dongfeng Citroen CITROEN (PSA) Wuhan 
Citroën Fukang 1.4RL Sub Compact Car 2000/06-2003/03 Dongfeng Citroen CITROEN (PSA) Wuhan 
Jetta 1.6CL Compact Car 1997/01-1999/02 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
Jetta 1.6GL Compact Car 1998/05-2000/06 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
Jetta 1.6GTX Compact Car 1999/03-2003/03 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
Jetta 1.6GiX Compact Car 2000/06-2003/03 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
Santana 1.8LX Compact  Car 1994/01-2000/05 Shanghai-VW VW Shanghai 
Santana 1.8ED Compact  Car 2000/06-2003/03 Shanghai-VW VW Shanghai 
Santana2000 1.8GSi Midsize Car 1997/01-2003/03 Shanghai-VW VW Shanghai 
RedFlag Luckstar 1.8AE Midsize Car 1998/04-2003/03 FAW  Changchun 
Adui 200 2.6L Midsize luxury car 2000/06-2003/03 FAW-VW AUDI (VW) Changchun 
BuickCentury 3.0 AT Midsize luxury car 2000/03-2003/03 Shanghai-GM GM Shanghai 
Northernstar 0.8 Minivan 1998/01-2000/05 Changhe-Suzuki Technology transfer from SUZUKI Hefei 
BJ2020S Mini SUV 1997/07-2003/03 Beijing-Jeep DCX Beijing 
Chrokee 7250 2.5EL Compact SUV 1997/07-2003/03 Beijing-Jeep DCX Beijing 
2004-2006 Models produced by domestic makers or joint ventures 
Alto HappyPrince Microcar 2004/01-2006/12 Changan Suzuki Technology transfer from SUZUKI Chongqing 
Xiali Junya  Microcar 2004/01-2006/12 FAW-Xiali  Tianjin 
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Model Name Classification Sample Period Manufacturer OEM Partner Location 
Fukang 1.6AXCA Sub Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 Dongfeng Citroen CITROEN (PSA) Wuhan 
Elysee SX16V  Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 Dongfeng Citroen CITROEN (PSA) Wuhan 
Bora 1.8T Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
Jetta 1.6CiX Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
Polo 1.4L Sub Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 Shanghai-VW VW Shanghai 
BuickSail 1.6SL Sub Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 Shanghai-GM GM Shanghai 
WindCloud 1.6 Compact Car 2004/01-2006/12 Chery Automobile   Wuhu 
Accord 2.4I-VTEC Midsize Car 2004/01-2006/12 Guangzhou-Honda HONDA Guangzhou 
RedFlag CenturyStar2.0E Midsize Car 2004/01-2006/12 FAW  Changchun 
Santana 1.8GLi Compact  Car 2004/01-2006/12 Shanghai-VW VW Shanghai 
PASSAT 2.0L Midsize Car 2004/01-2006/12 Shanghai-VW VW Shanghai 
BuickRegal 2.5GL Midsize Car 2004/01-2006/12 Shanghai-GM GM Shanghai 
Audi A6 2.8AT Midsize luxury car 2004/01-2006/12 FAW-VW VW Changchun 
GreenStar 1.0FHK Minivan 2004/01-2006/12 Changan Suzuki Technology transfer from SUZUKI Chongqing 
Minyi 1.0H Minivan 2004/01-2006/12 Hafei Motor  Harbin 
HIACE 2.2ME Van 2004/01-2006/12 Brilliance China Auto TOYOTA Shenyang 
Foton View 2.2 Van 2004/01-2006/12 Beijing Automobile  Beijing 
Chrokee 2500 2.5EB Compact SUV 2004/01-2006/12 Beijing-Jeep DCX Beijing 
Changfeng Plat fourvat2.3 Midsize SUV 2004/01-2006/12 Changfeng Motor Technology transfer from MITSUBISHI Changsha 
GreatWall Safe 2.2DY Midsize SUV 2004/01-2006/12 Great Wall Motor   Baoding 
2004-2006 Import Cars      
Camry 2.4L Midsize Car 2004/01-2006/12 TOYOTA  Japan 
Benz S350  3.5AT Full-size luxury car 2004/01-2006/12 DCX  Germany 
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Model Name Classification Sample Period Manufacturer OEM Partner Location 
BMW 745i  4.4L Full-size luxury car 2004/01-2006/12 BMW  Germany 
Landcruiser 4500 4.5AT Full-size SUV 2004/01-2006/12 TOYOTA  Japan 
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TABLE 5.3 Summary Statistics-Variability of Price Differentials 
Model Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
1994-2003 Models produced by domestic makers or joint ventures 
Xiali 1.0 -0.012  -0.417  0.545  0.135  2430 
Xiali 1.3 -0.047  -0.425  0.184  0.097  1192 
Citroën Fukang 1.6AL 0.064  -0.202  0.401  0.103  1314 
Citroën Fukang 988 1.6EL 0.004  -0.216  0.185  0.057  1346 
Citroën Fukang 1.4RL -0.008  -0.237  0.243  0.098  623 
Jetta 1.6CL 0.043  -0.163  0.232  0.072  578 
Jetta 1.6GL -0.031  -0.190  0.362  0.117  348 
Jetta 1.6GTX 0.002  -0.204  0.163  0.056  1554 
Jetta 1.6GiX 0.008  -0.176  0.317  0.048  941 
Santana 1.8LX -0.015  -0.182  0.260  0.077  2325 
Santana 1.8ED 0.012  -0.193  0.249  0.074  939 
Santana2000 1.8GSi -0.027  -0.293  0.118  0.058  2552 
RedFlag Luckstar 1.8AE 0.022  -0.240  0.223  0.075  1833 
Adui 200 2.6L -0.022  -0.255  0.182  0.102  782 
BuickCentury 3.0AT 0.033  -0.269  0.241  0.105  941 
Northernstar 0.8 0.278  -0.239  0.636  0.147  723 
BJ2020S 0.074  -0.268  0.343  0.082  1913 
Cherokee 7250 2.5EL 0.086  -0.191  0.310  0.087  2249 
2004-2006 Models produced by domestic makers or joint ventures   
Alto 0.8A -0.006  -0.289  0.224  0.072  1133 
Xiali Junya 1.0A 0.013  -0.320  0.314  0.087  1050 
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Model Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
Citroën Fukang 1.6AXCA -0.010  -0.312  0.274  0.107  937 
Elysee 1.6SX16V  -0.054  -0.375  0.171  0.084  1092 
Bora 1.8T -0.056  0.330  0.166  0.091  1127 
Jetta 1.6CiX 0.003  -0.206  0.183  0.073  880 
Polo 1.4L 0.037  -0.269  0.235  0.074  1159 
BuickSail 1.6SL 0.045  -0.293  0.331  0.094  1157 
WindCloud 1.6L -0.013  -0.672  0.431  0.148  1137 
Accord 2.4I-VTEC 0.015  -0.123  0.195  0.046  1117 
RedFlag CenturyStar2.0E -0.011  -0.135  0.159  0.050  1023 
Santana 1.8GLi 0.000  -0.266  0.224  0.091  966 
Passat 2.0 MT 0.018  -0.117  0.241  0.051  1226 
BuickRegal GL2.5 -0.024  -0.325  0.148  0.064  1191 
Audi A6 2.8AT -0.012  -0.321  0.222  0.070  1188 
GreenStar 1.0FHK -0.006  -0.273  0.494  0.098  965 
Minyi 1.0H 0.001  -0.259  0.265  0.085  1173 
Hiace 2.2ME -0.086  -0.546  0.111  0.207  949 
Foton View 2.2 -0.014  -0.362  0.472  0.148  763 
Chrokee 2500 4WD -0.052  -0.338  0.123  0.077  815 
Changfeng Plat fourvat2.3 -0.024  -0.245  0.268  0.108  924 
GreatWall Safe 4WD -0.262  -0.533  0.115  0.102  882 
2004-2006 Import Cars      
Camry 2.4L 0.011  -0.371  0.260  0.078  1166 
Benz S350 3.5AT 0.008  -0.291  0.297  0.081  1090 
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Model Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
BMW745i 4.4L 0.046  -0.210  0.315  0.079  918 
Landcruiser 4500 4.5AT 0.036  -0.371  0.316  0.104  1014 
mean 0.002  -0.269  0.267  0.090   
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TABLE 5.4 Summary Statistics- Mean Absolute Price Differentials 
Model Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
1994-2003 Models Produced by Domestic Makers or Joint Ventures 
Xiali 1.0 0.101  0.000  0.545  0.090  2430 
Xiali 1.3 0.075  0.000  0.425  0.076  1192 
Citroën Fukang 1.6AL 0.084  0.000  0.401  0.088  1314 
Citroën Fukang 988 1.6EL 0.042  0.000  0.216  0.038  1346 
Citroën Fukang 1.4RL 0.080  0.000  0.243  0.056  623 
Jetta 1.6CL 0.054  0.000  0.232  0.064  578 
Jetta 1.6GL 0.094  0.000  0.362  0.075  348 
Jetta 1.6GTX 0.040  0.000  0.204  0.040  1554 
Jetta 1.6GiX 0.035  0.000  0.317  0.033  941 
Santana 1.8LX 0.047  0.000  0.260  0.063  2325 
Santana 1.8ED 0.060  0.000  0.249  0.045  939 
Santana2000 1.8GSi 0.045  0.000  0.293  0.046  2552 
RedFlag LuckStar 1.8AE 0.062  0.000  0.240  0.049  1833 
Adui 200 2.6L 0.085  0.000  0.255  0.060  782 
BuickCentury 3.0 AT 0.086  0.000  0.269  0.069  941 
NorthernStar 0.8 0.285  0.000  0.636  0.133  723 
BJ2020S 0.089  0.000  0.343  0.065  1913 
Chrokee 7250 2.5EL 0.096  0.000  0.310  0.074  2249 
2004-2006 Models Produced by Domestic Makers or Joint Ventures 
Alto 0.8A 0.040  0.000  0.289  0.060  1133 
Xiali Junya 1.0A 0.049  0.000  0.320  0.073  1050 
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Model Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
Citroën Fukang 1.6AXCA 0.080  0.000  0.312  0.071  937 
Elysee 1.6SX16V  0.078  0.000  0.375  0.063  1092 
Bora 1.8T 0.078  0.000  0.330  0.073  1127 
Jetta 1.6CiX 0.055  0.000  0.206  0.048  880 
Polo 1.4L 0.060  0.000  0.235  0.057  1159 
BuickSail 1.6SL 0.080  0.000  0.331  0.067  1157 
WindCloud 1.6L 0.113  0.000  0.672  0.097  1137 
Accord 2.4I-VTEC 0.027  0.000  0.195  0.040  1117 
RedFlag CenturyStar2.0E 0.036  0.000  0.159  0.036  1023 
Santana 1.8GLi 0.072  0.000  0.266  0.055  966 
Passat 2.0L 0.039  0.000  0.241  0.038  1226 
BuickRegal 2.5GL 0.046  0.000  0.325  0.050  1191 
Audi A6 2.8AT 0.048  0.000  0.321  0.052  1188 
GreenStar 1.0FHK 0.073  0.000  0.066  0.494  965 
Minyi 1.0H 0.065  0.000  0.265  0.055  1173 
Hiace 2.2ME 0.096  0.000  0.546  0.103  949 
Foton View 2.2 0.113  0.000  0.472  0.095  763 
Chrokee 2500 2.5EB 0.063  0.000  0.338  0.068  815 
Changfeng Plat fourvat2.3 0.070  0.000  0.268  0.085  924 
GreatWall Safe 2.2DY 0.263  0.000  0.494  0.100  882 
2004-2006 Import Cars      
Camry 2.4L 0.051  0.000  0.260  0.060  1166 
Benz S350 3.5AT 0.051  0.000  0.297  0.064  1090 
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Model Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
BMW745i 4.4L 0.067  0.000  0.315  0.062  918 
Landcruiser 4500 4.5AT 0.090  0.000  0.371  0.064  1014 
mean 0.076  0.000  0.320  0.075   
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TABLE 6.1 Univariate Unit Root Tests by Model 
  ADF Test  Nonlinear Unit Root Test 
     
KSS1 Demeaned KSS2 Demeaned KSS1 Detrended KSS2 Detrended 
Model No. of Series 5% 10%   5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
1994-2003 Models Produced by Domestic Makers or Joint Ventures     
  
 
Xiali 1.0 35 5/35 6/35  9/35 12/35 9/35 12/35 11/35 11/35 9/35 9/35 
Xiali 1.3 30 3/30 5/30  8/30 9/30 8/30 10/30 4/30 4/30 4/30 5/30 
Fukang 1.4AL 20 5/20 5/20  8/20 9/20 7/20 7/20 10/20 12/20 11/20 13/20 
Fukang 1.6AL 34 4/34 4/34  4/34 6/34 4/34 6/34 4/34 5/34 4/34 5/34 
Fukang988 1.6EL 32 3/32 7/32  4/32 8/32 6/32 9/32 2/32 6/32 2/32 6/32 
Jetta 1.6CL 23 5/23 9/23  7/23 8/23 7/23 9/23 9/23 13/23 11/23 14/23 
Jetta 1.6GL 14 1/14 2/14  1/14 3/14 1/14 3/14 2/14 2/14 2/14 5/14 
Jetta 1.6GTX 34 4/34 6/34  3/34 5/34 5/34 7/34 5/34 9/34 6/34 10/34 
Jetta 1.6GiX 29 20/29 20/29  23/29 23/29 23/29 23/29 23/29 23/29 23/29 23/29 
Santana 1.8LX 35 9/35 19/35  22/35 24/35 21/35 25/35 18/35 26/35 17/35 25/35 
Santana 1.8ED 29 12/29 14/29  13/29 16/29 10/29 12/29 12/29 14/29 11/29 13/29 
Santana2000 1.8GSi 35 12/35 15/35  9/35 10/35 9/35 9/35 6/35 9/35 9/35 16/35 
RedFlag Luckstar 1.8AE 34 2/34 3/34  6/34 8/34 4/34 6/34 5/34 9/34 7/34 10/34 
Adui 200 2.6L 24 2/24 2/24  3/24 4/24 3/24 3/24 8/24 9/24 8/24 9/24 
BuickCentury 3.0  29 1/29 1/29  3/29 3/29 3/29 3/29 2/29 3/29 2/29 3/29 
Northernstar 0.8 26 7/26 10/26  14/26 16/26 16/26 17/26 13/26 14/26 12/26 14/26 
BJ2020S 33 5/33 9/33  6/33 9/33 8/33 11/33 8/33 9/33 8/33 10/33 
Chrokee 7250 2.5EL 35 2/35 2/35  4/35 5/35 4/35 5/35 3/35 6/35 3/35 6/35 
Ovearall 1994-2003 531 102/531 139/531  148/531 178/531 152/531 177/531 161/531 184/531 151/531 196/531 
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2004-2006 Models Produced by Domestic Makers or Joint Ventures 
Alto 0.8A 32 4/32 10/32  15/32 17/32 17/32 19/32 12/32 17/32 17/32 20/32 
Xiali Junya 1.0A 30 6/30 10/30  12/30 13/30 13/30 14/30 9/30 11/30 13/30 15/30 
Fukang 1.6AXCA 27 5/27 7/27  7/27 9/27 8/27 12/27 7/27 7/27 6/27 6/27 
Elysee 1.6SX16V  31 5/31 8/31  3/31 3/31 3/31 3/31 4/31 6/31 3/31 5/31 
Bora 1.8T 32 4/32 6/32  7/32 7/32 9/32 11/32 8/32 13/32 8/32 11/32 
Jetta 1.6CiX 25 5/25 7/25  8/25 8/25 8/25 8/25 8/25 9/25 6/25 8/25 
BuickSail 1.6SL 33 12/33 17/33  15/33 18/33 18/33 22/33 10/33 12/33 10/33 15/33 
Polo 1.4L 33 10/33 12/33  8/33 8/33 8/33 8/33 14/33 18/33 12/33 16/33 
WindCloud 1.6 33 3/33 7/33  11/33 11/33 11/33 12/33 9/33 10/33 8/33 11/33 
Santana 1.8GLi 27 5/27 7/27  7/27 11/27 7/27 11/27 7/27 9/27 4/27 7/27 
Passat 2.0L 35 11/35 13/35  16/35 21/35 16/35 18/35 23/35 30/35 20/35 27/35 
BuickRegal 2.5GL 34 10/34 15/34  17/34 18/34 16/34 18/34 14/34 18/34 14/34 18/34 
Accord 2.4I-VTEC 32 9/32 11/32  13/32 15/32 12/32 13/32 11/32 13/32 9/32 11/32 
RedFlag CenturyStar2.0E 29 18/29 20/29  20/29 21/29 18/29 20/29 15/29 17/29 13/29 15/29 
Audi A6 2.8AT 34 2/34 2/34  7/34 8/34 6/34 7/34 8/34 10/34 8/34 10/34 
GreenStar 1.0FHK 28 8/28 9/28  9/28 10/28 9/28 10/28 10/28 14/28 9/28 14/28 
Minyi 1.0H 34 5/34 7/34  8/34 10/34 8/34 10/34 9/34 10/34 9/34 11/34 
Hiace 2.2ME 28 3/28 5/28  10/28 10/28 10/28 11/28 12/28 13/28 12/28 13/28 
Foton View 2.2 MT 22 1/22 3/22  5/22 7/22 5/22 7/22 12/22 13/22 12/22 14/22 
Chrokee 2500 2.5EB 23 1/23 2/23  5/23 5/23 5/23 5/23 5/23 6/23 5/23 7/23 
Changfeng Plat fourvat2.3 26 4/26 9/26  8/26 9/26 9/26 9/26 14/26 15/26 14/26 16/26 
GreatWall Safe 2.2B 26 5/26 8/26  8/26 9/26 7/26 9/26 10/26 13/26 8/26 11/26 
2004-2006 Import Cars 
Camry 2.4L 34 13/34 18/34  12/34 13/34 12/34 14/34 8/34 10/34 10/34 10/34 
Benz S350 3.5AT 31 5/31 12/31  12/31 13/31 5/31 10/31 9/31 10/31 5/31 5/31 
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BMW 745i  4.4L 26 6/26 9/26  5/26 6/26 5/26 8/26 5/26 8/26 5/26 7/26 
Landcruiser 4500 4.5AT 29 4/29 5/29  8/29 10/29 6/29 8/29 7/29 10/29 5/29 9/29 
Ovearall 2004-2006 774 164/774 239/774  259/774 290/774 258/774 297/774 277/774 322/774 259/774 312/774 
Total  1305 266/1305 378/1305  403/1305 468/1305 399/1305 474/1305 405/1305 506/1305 394/1305 508/1305 
 
NOTES: For each series, in column 3 and column4, the following ADF equation was estimated：
, , , , , , 1 , , , , , ,
1
Z
i k t i k i k i k t i k t i k t z i k t
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p c p pα β ε
− −
=
∆ = + + ∆ +∑ . In all equations the lag 
length, Z was determined for each series by using the Modified Akaiki Information Criterion (MAIC). KSS1 test refers to the estimation based on the equation 
3
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TABLE 6.2 Univariate Unit Root Tests by City 
  ADF Test  Nonlinear Unit Root Test 
 
     KSS1 Demeaned  KSS2 Demeaned KSS1 Detrended KSS2 Detrended 
City No. of Series 5% 10%  5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Tianjin 40 7/40 13/40  10/40 12/40 10/40 12/40 13/40 18/40 12/40 16/40 
Shijiazhuang 37 7/37 10/37  11/37 14/37 10/37 12/37 12/37 14/37 14/37 14/37 
Taiyuan 33 9/33 12/33  12/33 14/33 14/33 16/33 11/33 15/33 11/33 14/33 
Hohehot 35 7/35 7/35  11/35 11/35 10/35 11/35 8/35 11/35 7/35 9/35 
Shenyang 39 8/39 12/39  13/39 14/39 11/39 12/39 15/39 17/39 14/39 18/39 
Dalian 42 5/42 6/42  7/42 9/42 7/42 8/42 8/42 11/42 8/42 10/42 
Changchun 35 10/35 13/35  9/35 10/35 12/35 13/35 8/35 10/35 8/35 12/35 
Harbin 39 7/39 11/39  16/39 16/39 14/39 14/39 19/39 21/39 17/39 19/39 
Shanghai 33 3/33 10/33  9/33 10/33 7/33 9/33 8/33 11/33 6/33 10/33 
Nanjing 39 8/39 10/39  9/39 10/39 10/39 10/39 12/39 14/39 14/39 16/39 
Hangzhou 38 5/38 12/38  14/38 17/38 15/38 18/38 12/38 14/38 13/38 16/38 
Ningbo 40 9/40 10/40  15/40 16/40 11/40 12/40 11/40 13/40 7/40 9/40 
Hefei 40 8/40 9/40  15/40 16/40 14/40 14/40 18/40 21/40 17/40 20/40 
Fuzhou 37 7/37 10/37  10/37 12/37 13/37 15/37 13/37 14/37 13/37 15/37 
Xiamen 37 9/37 13/37  7/37 9/37 9/37 13/37 7/37 8/37 7/37 9/37 
Nanchang 35 6/35 8/35  9/35 9/35 9/35 11/35 6/35 12/35 8/35 15/35 
Jinan 42 10/42 19/42  14/42 17/42 13/42 17/42 17/42 21/42 17/42 20/42 
Qingdao 44 8/44 11/44  11/44 15/44 11/44 13/44 11/44 12/44 11/44 15/44 
Zhengzhou 31 7/31 11/31  9/31 11/31 9/31 13/31 10/31 11/31 8/31 10/31 
Wuhan 43 7/43 10/43  12/43 15/43 13/43 15/43 12/43 15/43 11/43 16/43 
Changsha 39 10/39 13/39  15/39 15/39 14/39 15/39 13/39 15/39 14/39 18/39 
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Guangzhou 39 11/39 11/39  13/39 14/39 14/39 15/39 17/39 19/39 14/39 17/39 
Shenzhen 32 9/32 11/32  12/32 13/32 13/32 14/32 11/32 13/32 11/32 14/32 
Nanning 43 5/43 8/43  9/43 12/43 9/43 12/43 12/43 12/43 11/43 13/43 
Haikou 33 5/33 8/33  5/33 8/33 5/33 8/33 5/33 9/33 5/33 10/33 
Chengdu 34 8/34 12/34  10/34 13/34 10/34 14/34 11/34 11/34 8/34 9/34 
Chongqing 24 6/24 7/24  5/24 7/24 4/24 7/24 6/24 9/24 5/24 9/24 
Guiyang 40 10/40 14/40  12/40 15/40 11/40 16/40 10/40 12/40 11/40 15/40 
Kunming 43 12/43 15/43  17/43 20/43 16/43 19/43 19/43 23/43 20/43 24/43 
Lahsa 23 5/23 5/23  6/23 6/23 10/23 10/23 5/23 7/23 8/23 11/23 
Sian 43 6/43 12/43  19/43 20/43 16/43 17/43 12/43 22/43 12/43 19/43 
Lanzhou 42 8/42 12/42  16/42 17/42 17/42 18/42 15/42 21/42 15/42 21/42 
Xining 37 12/37 15/37  14/37 18/37 12/37 17/37 12/37 20/37 12/37 19/37 
Yinchuan 36 8/36 10/36  14/36 18/36 13/36 17/36 14/36 17/36 13/36 14/36 
Urumchi 38 4/38 8/38  13/38 16/38 13/38 17/38 12/38 13/38 12/38 12/38 
Total 1305 266/1305 378/1305  403/1305 468/1305 399/1305 474/1305 405/1305 506/1305 394/1305 508/1305 
 
NOTES: For each series, in column 3 and column4, the following ADF equation was estimated：
, , , , , , 1 , , , , , ,
1
Z
i k t i k i k i k t i k t i k t z i k t
z
p c p pα β ε
− −
=
∆ = + + ∆ +∑ . In all equations the lag 
length, Z was determined for each series by using the Modified Akaiki Information Criterion (MAIC). KSS1 test refers to the estimation based on the equation 
3
, , , , 1 , ,i k t i k t i k tp pδ ε−∆ = + , KSS2 refers to 3, , , , , , 1 , ,
1
p
i k t j i k t j i k t i k t
j
p p pρ δ ε
− −
=
∆ = ∆ + +  ∑ . 
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TABLE 6.3 Panel Unit Root Tests 
Product No. of Series MW Statistic No. of Significant Constants DT Test (p<10%/N) Half Life (Month) 
1994-2003 Models Produced by Domestic Makers or Joint Ventures 
Xiali 1.0 35 104.207* 4 1 2.330  
Xiali 1.3 30 78.7274** 10 0 1.346  
Fukang 1.4AL 20 75.9501* 10 0 1.194  
Fukang 1.6AL 34 107.51* 1 1 1.112  
Fukang988 1.6EL 32 86.0858** 15 0 1.760  
Jetta 1.6CL 23 90.4676* 3 1 0.650  
Jetta 1.6GL 14 24.5882 4 0 — 
Jetta 1.6GTX 34 113.045* 7 2 2.084  
Jetta 1.6GiX 29 432.218* 19 16 0.724  
Santana 1.8LX 35 196.665* 2 4 2.327  
Santana 1.8ED 29 153.192* 18 4 1.590  
Santana2000 GSi 35 200.926* 10 4 2.669  
RedFlag LuckStar 1.8AE 34 85.8635*** 9 0 2.337  
Adui 200 2.6L 24 42.99 5 0 — 
BuickCentury 3.0  29 37.6785 4 0 — 
NorthernStar 0.8 26 190.694* 20 4 1.475  
BJ2020S 33 111.681* 19 1 2.535  
Chrokee 7250 2.5EL 35 64.0059 9 0 — 
2004-2006 Models Produced by Domestic Makers or Joint Ventures 
Alto 0.8A 32 94.9983* 5 2 1.225  
Xiali Junya 1.0A 30 146.452* 5 2 1.480  
Fukang 1.6AXCA 27 98.1483* 6 3 1.253  
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Product No. of Series MW Statistic No. of Significant Constants DT Test (p<10%/N) Half Life (Month) 
Elysee 1.6SX16V  31 110.445* 18 1 1.411  
Bora 1.8T 32 94.5113* 16 0 1.492  
Jetta 1.6CiX 25 94.4972* 8 2 1.129  
BuickSail 1.6SL 33 203.995* 10 3 1.174  
Polo 1.4L 33 171.412* 14 4 1.296  
WindCloud 1.6 33 107.463* 9 1 1.240  
Santana 1.8GLi 27 84.5113* 8 0 1.226  
Passat 2.0L 35 154.25* 7 2 0.996  
BuickRegal 2.5GL 34 154.396* 9 1 1.050  
Accord 2.4I-VTEC 32 131.451* 3 2 1.070  
RedFlag CenturyStar2.0E 29 248.378* 14 9 1.316  
Audi A6 2.8AT 34 56.4336 5 0 — 
GreenStar 1.0FHK 28 131.939* 10 4 0.592  
Minyi 1.0H 34 112.111* 11 0 1.100  
Hiace 2.2ME 28 76.7283* 13 2 0.398  
Foton View 2.2 MT 22 62.5* 9 1 1.595  
Chrokee 2500 2.5EB 23 37.2967 4 1 — 
Changfeng Plat fourvat2.3 26 103.018* 6 3 1.190  
GreatWall Safe 2.2B 26 113.514* 16 3 1.376  
2004-2006 Import Cars 
Camry 2.4L 34 212.517* 10 5 0.968  
Benz S350  3.5AT 31 130.545* 4 1 1.188  
BMW 745i  4.4L 26 87.2832* 11 1 1.519  
Landcruiser 4500 4.5AT 29 70.4681** 9 0 1.130  
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NOTES: For each series, the ADF equation used to construct MW test was estimated：
, , , , , , 1 , , , , , ,
1
Z
i k t i k i k i k t i k t i k t z i k t
z
p c p pα β ε
− −
=
∆ = + + ∆ +∑ . In all equations the lag length, Z was 
determined for each series by using the Modified Akaiki Information Criterion (MAIC). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% error level. The 
reported number of significant constants refers to the number of univariate ADF equations for which the intercept is significant at 10% level. The reported half lives are the 
median value of 
,
| ln(0.5) / ln(1 ) |i kh α= +  from the univariate ADF equations for those series which can past the ADF test at 10% significance level. The marginal 
significance levels fro the DT (Dufour-Torres) test were adjusted as follows: for each model, at least one  p-value,  ip  must be less than 0.1/N （10%）, N is the number of 
series for each model in my study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 86 
Table 6.4 Pooled OLS Result A 
Dependent variable: Std. Dev. of yearly average price 
Variable  Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t statistic  p value 
Constant 0.0370671 0.0078830  4.70  0.000  
Income 0.0046495 0.0022919  2.03  0.043  
Distance  0.0014207 0.0006541  2.17  0.030  
LOCAL 0.0030461 0.0032175  0.95  0.344  
Time Trend -0.0008298 0.0004573  -1.81  0.070  
Model Dummies YES       
R Squared  0.1869 Number of obs 3842  
 
Table 6.5 Pooled OLS Result B 
Dependent variable: Yearly Average of |price difference| 
Variable  Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t statistic  p value 
Constant -0.0591853 0.0134478  -4.40  0.000  
Income 0.0079483 0.0039178  2.03  0.043  
Distance  0.0000336 0.0011163  0.03  0.976  
Local 0.0095599 0.0055030  1.74  0.082  
Time Trend 0.0087885 0.0007805  11.26  0.000  
Model Dummies YES       
R Squared  0.4540  Number of obs 3852  
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Figure 1.1 Vehicle Production from 1994-2006 (Thousand Units)
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Figure3.1 Passenger Car Market Structure 1994-2006
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